The failure of Stolypinism What about the peasants? Perhaps the Russian village was just ready to accept capitalism and follow the “saving farm path”? But no - capitalization in pre-revolutionary Russia did not actually affect agriculture. Stolypinskoe

from the outdated idea that Russia is weak and will not be able to seriously threaten Germany in the East, and England will not actively support France

2) Belgian troops showed significant resistance to the Germans

3) The British managed to land in France and actively entered into hostilities

4) The advance of Russian troops on the Eastern Front diverted part of the German army from the French theater of operations

5) German troops were worse armed

2. indicate two groups of reasons: 1) why the Germans were able to come close to Moscow 2) why the Soviet troops managed to defend Moscow.
3.list the reasons why the Germans were unable to implement the blitzkrieg (blitzkrieg) plan against the USSR. Which of them, in your opinion, are the main ones?

studied by you in 7th grade.) What are the results of these wars?

2. Give a general assessment of the Tilsit Agreements. What do you see as positive consequences of the Tilsit agreements for Russia and what as negative ones?
3. What was the international position of Russia after the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit?
4. Determine the nature of the Russian-Swedish war and evaluate its results.
5. What do you see as the main result of the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812?
6. What were the consequences of the Russian-Iranian war of 1804-1813?

Option #1.

A1. The Battle of Moscow has begun
A) December 6, 1941; B) November 19, 1942; B) July 6, 1941; D) April 16, 1942.

A2. Citizens of the USSR, for the first time in 1941. heard the words addressed to them: “The enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours!” in a speech
A) M.I. Kalinina December 31; B) I.V. Stalin on November 7;
B) G.K. Zhukov December 6; D) V.M. Molotov June 22.

A3. December 5-6, 1941 The counter-offensive of the Red Army began under
A) Kyiv; B) Moscow; B) Leningrad; D) Stalingrad.

A4. In February 1945 a meeting of the heads of government of the three allied powers took place in
A) Moscow; B) Tehran; In Yalta; D) Potsdam.

A5. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief during the Great Patriotic War was
A) G.K. Zhukov; B) I.V. Stalin; B) K.E. Voroshilov; D) S.M. Budyonny.

A6. I. Stalin issued order No. 227 “Not a step back!” dated July 28, 1942 was caused by a threat
A) the seizure of Crimea by the Germans; B) a new German breakthrough near Moscow;
B) the Germans reaching the Urals from the south; D) the surrender of Stalingrad and the exit of the German armies to the Volga.

A7. The most important reason for the failure of the German offensive plan in the Battle of Kursk was (o)
A) a preemptive strike by Soviet artillery;
B) entry into battle of Siberian reserve divisions;
B) encircling the bulk of German troops in a “cauldron” on the Kursk Bulge;
D) a strike by partisan formations in the rear of the Germans.

A8. The consequence of the Moscow Battle was that
A) the Second Front was opened in Europe;
B) the German plan for a “blitzkrieg” was thwarted;
C) there was a radical turning point in the war;
D) Germany began to lose its allies in the war.

A9. When was the Second Front opened?
A) May 1, 1944; B) August 20, 1944; B) June 6, 1944; D) January 1944

A11. Name of the operation of Soviet troops near Stalingrad:
A) "Barbarossa"; B) "Citadel"; B) “Uranus”; D) "Typhoon".

A12. The anti-Hitler coalition has finally taken shape:
A) the signing of an agreement on the alliance between the USSR and Great Britain;
B) signing an agreement on the alliance between the USSR and France;
C) the signing of an agreement between the USSR and the USA;
D) recognition of the USSR by Western countries.

A13. In honor of what event was a victorious salute given for the first time in Moscow?
A) the surrender of German troops in Stalingrad;
B) the failure of the German offensive on the Kursk Bulge, the liberation of Orel and Belgorod;
B) liberation of Kyiv;
D) German surrender in Berlin.

A14. The following decisions were made at the Potsdam Conference:
A) about the date of entry of the USSR into the war with Japan,
B) about the transfer of the city of Koenigsberg and the surrounding area to the USSR,
B) about the management of post-war Germany,
D) about reparations from Germany.

A15. The following front commanders took part in Operation Bagration:
A) Bagramyan, B) Chernyakhovsky, C) Rokossovsky, D) Konev.

A16. The front commanders in the Berlin operation were:
A) Vasilevsky, B) Zhukov, C) Konev, D) Rokossovsky.

IN 1. Match the battles with the years in which they occurred:
1) near Smolensk A) 1944
2) near Kharkov B) 1943
3) for crossing the Dnieper B) 1942
4) for the liberation of Minsk D) 1941
D) 1945

AT 2. Match the names and facts:
1) I.V. Panfilov A) commander of the 62nd Army;
2) V.V. Talalikhin B) air ram;
3) I.V. Stalin B) commander of the division on the Volokolamsk highway;
4) V.I. Chuikov G) Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops.

C1. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of Marshal V.I. Chuikov and indicate what battle we are talking about.
“...Despite the enormous losses, the invaders pushed ahead. Columns of infantry in vehicles and tanks burst into the city. Apparently, the Nazis believed that his fate was decided, and each of them sought to reach the Volga, the city center as quickly as possible and profit from trophies there...our fighters...crawled out from under the German tanks...to the next line, where they were received and united to the units, supplied them, mainly with ammunition, and again threw them into battle.”

The meaning of the word "blitzkrieg" (Blitzkrieg - "lightning", Krieg - "war") is known to many. This is a military strategy. It involves a lightning-fast attack on the enemy using a large amount of military equipment. It is assumed that the enemy will not have time to deploy his main forces and will be successfully defeated. This is exactly the tactic the Germans used when they attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. We will talk about this military operation in our article.

Background

The theory of lightning war arose in the early 20th century. It was invented by the German military leader Alfred von Schlieffen. The tactics were very clever. The world was experiencing an unprecedented technological boom, and the military had new combat weapons at its disposal. But during the First World War the blitzkrieg failed. The imperfection of military equipment and weak aviation had an impact. Germany's rapid offensive against France faltered. The successful use of this method of military action was postponed until better times. And they came in 1940, when Nazi Germany carried out a lightning occupation, first in Poland and then in France.

"Barborossa"

In 1941, it was the USSR's turn. Hitler rushed to the East with a very specific goal. He needed to neutralize the Soviet Union in order to strengthen his dominance in Europe. England continued to resist, counting on the support of the Red Army. This obstacle had to be eliminated.

The Barbarossa plan was developed to attack the USSR. It was based on the theory of blitzkrieg. It was a very ambitious project. The German fighting machine was about to unleash all its might on the Soviet Union. It was considered possible to destroy the main forces of the Russian troops through the operational invasion of tank divisions. Four combat groups were created, combining tank, motorized and infantry divisions. They had to first penetrate far behind enemy lines, and then unite with each other. The ultimate goal of the new lightning war was to seize the territory of the USSR up to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line. Before the attack, Hitler's strategists were confident that the war with the Soviet Union would take them only three to four months.

Strategy

German troops were divided into three large groups: "North", "Center" and "South". "North" was advancing on Leningrad. "Center" was rushing towards Moscow. "South" was supposed to conquer Kyiv and Donbass. The main role in the attack was given to tank groups. There were four of them, led by Guderian, Hoth, Gopner and Kleist. It was they who were supposed to carry out the fleeting blitzkrieg. It wasn't that impossible. However, the German generals miscalculated.

Start

On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began. German bombers were the first to cross the border of the Soviet Union. They bombed Russian cities and military airfields. It was a smart move. The destruction of Soviet aviation gave the invaders a serious advantage. The damage was particularly severe in Belarus. In the first hours of the war, 700 aircraft were destroyed.

Then German ground divisions entered the lightning war. And if the army group “North” managed to successfully cross the Neman and approach Vilnius, then the “Center” met unexpected resistance in Brest. Of course, this did not stop Hitler’s elite units. However, it made an impression on the German soldiers. For the first time they realized who they had to deal with. The Russians died, but did not give up.

Tank battles

The German Blitzkrieg in the Soviet Union failed. But Hitler had a huge chance of success. In 1941, the Germans had the most advanced military technology in the world. Therefore, the very first tank battle between the Russians and the Nazis turned into a beating. The fact is that Soviet combat vehicles of the 1932 model were defenseless against enemy guns. They did not meet modern requirements. More than 300 T-26 and BT-7 light tanks were destroyed in the first days of the war. However, in some places the Nazis encountered serious resistance. The big shock for them was the meeting with the brand new T-34 and KV-1. German shells flew off the tanks, which seemed like unprecedented monsters to the invaders. But the general situation at the front was still catastrophic. The Soviet Union did not have time to deploy its main forces. The Red Army suffered huge losses.

Chronicle of events

Period from June 22, 1941 to November 18, 1942. Historians call it the first stage of the Great Patriotic War. At this time, the initiative belonged entirely to the invaders. In a relatively short period of time, the Nazis occupied Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine, Estonia, Belarus and Moldova. Then enemy divisions began the siege of Leningrad and captured Novgorod and Rostov-on-Don. However, the main goal of the Nazis was Moscow. This would allow the Soviet Union to be struck at the very heart. However, the lightning offensive quickly fell behind the approved schedule. On September 8, 1941, the military blockade of Leningrad began. The Wehrmacht troops stood under it for 872 days, but were never able to conquer the city. The Kyiv Cauldron is considered the largest defeat of the Red Army. More than 600,000 people died there. The Germans captured a huge amount of military equipment, opened their way to the Azov region and Donbass, but... lost precious time. It was not for nothing that the commander of the 2nd Panzer Division, Guderian, left the front line, came to Hitler’s headquarters and tried to convince him that Germany’s main task at the moment was the occupation of Moscow. Blitzkrieg is a powerful breakthrough into the interior of the country, which turns into complete defeat for the enemy. However, Hitler did not listen to anyone. He preferred to send military units of the “Center” to the South to seize territories where valuable natural resources were concentrated.

Blitzkrieg failure

This is a turning point in the history of Nazi Germany. Now the Nazis had no chance. They say that Field Marshal Keitel, when asked when he first realized that the blitzkrieg had failed, answered only one word: “Moscow.” The defense of the capital turned the tide of the Second World War. On December 6, 1941, the Red Army launched a counteroffensive. After this, the "blitzkrieg" war turned into a battle of attrition. How could enemy strategists make such a miscalculation? Among the reasons, some historians name total Russian impassability and severe frost. However, the invaders themselves pointed to two main reasons:

• fierce enemy resistance;
• biased assessment of the defense capability of the Red Army.

Of course, the fact that Russian soldiers defended their Motherland also played a role. And they managed to defend every inch of their native land. The failure of Nazi Germany's blitzkrieg against the USSR is a great feat that evokes sincere admiration. And this feat was accomplished by soldiers of the multinational Red Army.

Topic: “Reasons for the failure of the plan for a lightning war with Finland”

Target abstract: explain why the Soviet General Staff's lightning war plan failed in the Winter War of 1939-1940.

Abstract problems: It is very difficult to conduct an accurate analysis of the war of 1939-1940 due to the presence of Soviet propaganda in Russian publications and excessive sympathy for the Finns in foreign literature. Only recently have relatively reliable information and declassified archives emerged.

abstract objectives:

study literature on the preparation and beginning of military operations of the Soviet-Finnish campaign.

to figure out, why did the small Finnish army manage to resist the superior Red Army?

Explain, what were the main reasons for the huge losses of the USSR.

Literature

Beginning of the war

War plans

Soviet command

Finnish command

Soviet army

Finnish army

Mannerheim Line as the main defensive line

Literature

• 
  Shirokorad A. B. Northern wars of Russia
• 
  Baryshnikov V. N. From a cool peace to a winter war: Finland’s Eastern policy in the 1930s
• 
  "M. I. Semiryaga. Secrets of Stalin's diplomacy. 1941-1945". Publishing house "Higher School", Moscow, 1992.
• 
  “Finnish granites, centuries-old granites.” Peaceful discussion about the “winter war”, with the participation of M. Semiryagi, V. Baryshnikov, the Ambassador of Finland to Russia and others. © 1995 Rodina magazine
• 
  Meltyukhov M.I. “Stalin’s missed chance. The Soviet Union and the struggle for Europe: 1939-1941"
• 
  Mannerheim K. G. Memoirs. - M.: Vagrius, 1999
• 
  Milan Gnezda. "Finland in the Second World War" (in English)
• 
  Alexander Tvardovsky “Two Lines”, Library of Selected Lyrics. Moscow, “Young Guard”, 1964 - a poem dedicated to the memory of Soviet soldiers who died during the war
• 
  The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939-1940 (Hardcover) by Max Jakobson, ISBN 0-674-20950-8.
• 
  V. E. Bystrov. Soviet commanders and military leaders, 1988
• 
  History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Military Publishing House, 1974
• 
  Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Olma-Press, 2005

Beginning of the war

In the early morning of November 30, 1939, the Soviet-Finnish border exploded with artillery cannonade, under the cover of which Red Army units crossed the border and launched an offensive deep into Finnish territory. The reason for this war was the dissatisfaction of the Soviet Union and General Secretary Stalin personally with the USSR’s “request” to give up a small territory of Finland in order to move the border away from Leningrad (a large industrial and political center) by at least 70 km. In exchange, a larger territory was offered, but less profitable. After lengthy negotiations, the Finnish government did not change its decision. The pretext was the shelling of the Russian settlement of Maynila, set up by NKVD officers. This campaign was not only one of the bloodiest for the USSR, but also had negative results in foreign policy - a war almost started against the Soviet Union across the entire European continent (both British and German divisions were transferred to the combat zone. The USSR was excluded from the League of Nations.

Perhaps the only positive was that the Red Army learned the bitter lessons of this war, which made it possible to more effectively resist subsequent fascist aggression.

Balance of forces at the beginning of the war

• 
  Cartridges for rifles, machine guns and machine guns for - 2.5 months
• 
  Shells for mortars, field guns and howitzers - 1 month
• 
  Fuels and lubricants - for 2 months
• 
  Aviation gasoline - for 1 month

Plans and preparations for war

“Let's start today... We will just raise our voices a little, and the Finns will only have to obey. If they persist, we will fire only one shot, and the Finns will immediately raise their hands and surrender” (Stalin’s speech in the Kremlin on the eve of the war).

The Soviet command envisaged a direct breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line and further advancement deep into Finnish territory to the capital of Finland, Helsinki. The command envisioned a quick, lightning war with little bloodshed; they wanted to crush the enemy with numerical and qualitative superiority. Most of the General Staff, including Stalin, supported this war plan. Only B.M. really looked at things. Shaposhnikov, who understood the possible consequences of such an ill-conceived plan. He advocated more thorough preparation for combat operations and a more detailed study of the enemy. For this point of view, Shaposhnikov almost lost his post, but later it was for this point of view that he was appointed commander of the General Staff and Marshal of the Soviet Union.

The Finnish plan was thought out much more sensibly and carefully. From the very moment of the formation of the state, all military force was aimed at defending the southern borders from the USSR. The entire south of the country was dotted with defensive structures, the main defensive line being the Mannerheim Line. Most of the Finnish fleet and coastal guns were located on Lake Ladoga. There were no defensive lines in the swampy areas, but special detachments of partisans were being trained, which in small groups were ideally trained to conduct combat operations in such areas. From the border areas, people were resettled inland; in these areas, roads were also deliberately destroyed and the terrain was swamped to impede the movement of equipment and large infantry units.

In foreign policy, the Finns established friendly relations with their closest neighbors and Western European countries. A military alliance was concluded with Estonia; airfields were built in the country to receive British, American and German cargo and to base Allied aircraft there.

So, one of the most important reasons for the large losses of the USSR in the winter war was the self-confidence and carelessness in the actions of the Soviet General Staff, which led to senseless deaths where they could have been avoided. The Finnish command, on the contrary, was ideally prepared for war in terms of tactics and strategy for a long war, in which the emphasis was placed precisely on depleting the advancing enemy forces, rather than gaining strategic superiority.

Soviet command

General Staff of the Red Army: K.E. Voroshilov, S.K. Timoshenko, B.M. Shaposhnikov

K.E. Voroshilov

K.E. Voroshilov worked at a metallurgical plant before the revolution. He took part in popular protests, for which he was arrested many times. His military career actually began in November 1917, when he was appointed commissar of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee. In the same year, he organized the first Lugansk detachment, which defended Kharkov from German-Austrian troops.

During the Civil War - commander of the Tsaritsyn group of forces, deputy commander and member of the Military Council of the Southern Front, commander of the 10th Army, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, commander of the Kharkov Military District, commander of the 14th Army and the internal Ukrainian Front. After the death of M. V. Frunze, Voroshilov headed the military department of the USSR.

In 1940, after the end of the war, Timoshenko was replaced in his post by personal order of Stalin.

S.K. Tymoshenko

Tymoshenko graduated from a rural school. In 1915 he was drafted into the army. He took part in the First World War, fighting on the Western Front as a machine gunner. In the Red Army since 1918. Commanded a platoon or squadron. In August 1918, at the head of a cavalry regiment, he participated in the defense of Tsaritsyn, from November 1918 - commander of a cavalry brigade (from June 1919 - in the corps of S. M. Budyonny). Member of the RCP(b) since 1919. In November 1919 - August 1920 commander of the 6th, from August 1920 to October 1921 - 4th Cavalry Division of the 1st Cavalry Army. He was wounded five times, but did not leave the line. For military exploits during the Civil War, he was awarded three Orders of the Red Banner and an Honorary Revolutionary Weapon.

He graduated from the Higher Military Academic Courses in 1922 and 1927, and the courses for single commanders at the N. G. Tolmachev Military-Political Academy in 1930. Commanded the 3rd and 6th Cavalry Corps. From August 1933 - deputy commander of the Belorussian troops, from September 1935 of the Kyiv Military District. From June 1937, commander of the troops of the North Caucasus, from September 1937 - of the Kharkov, from February 1938 - of the Kyiv Special Military District.

So, Tymoshenko had sufficient combat experience, but had less power compared to Voroshilov, who received his rank more for party activities than for military operations.

B.M. Shaposhnikov

In 1901-1903 B. M. Shaposhnikov studied at the Moscow Alekseevsky Military School, which he graduated with the 1st category and was promoted to the rank of second lieutenant. He began serving in the 1st Turkestan Rifle Battalion in Tashkent.

In 1907-1910 studied at the Academy of the General Staff (Imperial Nicholas Military Academy). Promoted to staff captain. After graduating from the academy, he continued his service in Tashkent, where he served until 1912.

From August 1914 he participated in the First World War as an adjutant at the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division , showed good knowledge of tactics, showed personal courage. In September 1917, B. M. Shaposhnikov was promoted to the rank of colonel and appointed commander of the Mingrelian Grenadier Regiment.

The Winter War became the peak of his career, when it turned out that he was the only one of the entire General Staff who was right about Finland.

The commander-in-chief of the Finnish army was Carl Gustav Mannerheim. This officer had enormous combat experience: from 1887-1917, Mannerheim served in the Russian army, starting his service as a cornet and ending with the rank of lieutenant general, that is, he commanded an entire division. On the side of the Russian army, he participated in the Russo-Japanese War, an expedition to China, and led a garrison in Poland.

Mannerheim gained his greatest combat experience during the First World War (he also took part on the side of the Russian Empire). He proved himself to be one of the best officers in the Russian army. He defeated the outnumbered Austrian forces in the city of Krasnik (defensive-offensive operation), broke out of encirclement with his division in 1914, took the city of Janow, ensured a successful crossing of the San River, held the city of Chernivtsi and carried out many other successful military operations, for which during the war he received the St. George Cross, 4th degree, the Golden Arms of St. George, and the Order of St. Svyatoslav, 1st degree.

During the revolution of 1917, he defended the independence of Finland from the Bolsheviks and helped the White Guard in the fight against the Red Army. After the revolution, he also remained true to his principles and recognized the Bolsheviks as his main enemies.

After the revolution and before the Finnish War, Mannerheim devoted his life to preparing Finland for the inevitable war with the USSR.

As a politician, he improved relations with all European countries, primarily hoping for help from England, France, Germany and even the USA. In relations with the USSR, he did everything to delay the war, but did not make concessions. In fact, he was not only the commander-in-chief, but also managed the country's foreign and domestic policy, although he officially became president only towards the end of the Second World War.

As commander-in-chief, he reformed the army according to the country's industrial capabilities. Realizing that the only advantage of his army could only be strategy, he appointed only the most successful commanders, and the appointments did not depend on the relationship of these people with Mannerheim or other factors. Mannerheim personally took part in most strategic decisions (even minor ones). By the beginning of the war, in fact, he had the greatest knowledge of defensive warfare in the world. Carl Gustav studied the construction of defensive fortifications in China (“scattered” small well-fortified structures), in France (Maginot Line), in Germany and other countries.

So, Mannerheim was not only an experienced commander, he was also very influential, despite his failure in the presidential elections. This gave him virtually no restrictions in his actions (unlike Soviet commanders, who were very limited in their actions).

Despite the defeat in the Soviet-Finnish war, Mannerheim received universal popular recognition and became a national hero.

It is safe to say that one of the most important reasons for the large losses of the USSR in the Northern War was the actions of the experienced and influential Finnish commander-in-chief, Carl Gustav Mannerheim.

In the winter war, the USSR involved 24 rifle divisions (about 1,000,000 soldiers), 3,000 tanks, and 3,800 aircraft.

The average Soviet rifle division consisted of 14.5 - 15 thousand soldiers. These were 14,000 riflemen and 419 machine gunners. The division included about 200 heavy machine guns, 32 anti-aircraft stationary machine guns, about 30 mortars and about 70 heavy long-range and light anti-tank guns. Motorized divisions were also equipped with equipment for transporting guns, ammunition and people, but the vast majority of divisions still used manpower for this purpose (about 300 horses). Commissars were assigned to each rifle unit - distinguished party members who were supposed to monitor the implementation of the orders of the General Staff, prevent the arbitrariness of commanders and raise the morale of the soldiers. In reality, the commissars only prevented division commanders and lower-ranking officers from acting more effectively.

The main weapon of the Red Army was the Mosin rifle - a weapon of the late 19th century. Although the rifle was indeed reliable, its combat qualities were at a very low level. While most armies in the world (not excluding the Finnish one) were switching to automatic carbines, the military industry of the USSR was in full swing arming the army with “reliable” and “more than once proven indispensable” Mosin rifles.

Aviation was represented mainly by TB-3 tactical bombers. The plane by that time was already outdated, but nevertheless effective. The small concentration of air defense and the enemy’s lack of a large number of their own fighters made it possible to use these tactical bombers quite effectively. But even here there were problems - both the pilots and the Air Force command did not have sufficient experience and ability to use military aviation; the General Staff considered the development of Air Force doctrines to be a waste of time and money. The result was a lack of coordination of air strikes, which led to a huge number of inaccurate strikes and air force losses where they could have been avoided. As evidence, one can cite the much more successful use of Mitchells and Flying Fortresses by the Americans in the Pacific War under similar conditions against the Japanese (although there they were sometimes opposed by Japanese Zero fighters, which were sometimes superior in numbers and even in quality).

The basis of the country's tank armament were light tanks of the BT series ("high-speed tanks") - in fact, they were used in the winter war and constituted the striking power of the Red Army. On the one hand, Russian tanks were some of the best in the world at that time and, according to the calculations of the Soviet command, they were the ones who should have broken through the Mannerheim Line. However, this was initially a failed plan - even without Finnish fortifications, the area for the use of tanks was very, very unfavorable. Many vehicles did not even reach the front - they sank in swamps, overturned in ravines, got stuck in the mud, the engines stalled at fifty degrees below zero, the tracks broke every minute... At the same time, the crew of the vehicle had to “fight” for the vehicle to the last - those who abandoned the tank were court-martialed as deserters and traitors. The cabins were not prepared for frost, so with the engines turned off, the crews froze right at the combat post, and the tank itself most often fell into the hands of the Finns and could later be used against the Red Army.

Moreover, tankers were forbidden to even camouflage their tanks, that is, in a snowy landscape, Soviet tanks were green. The ban was due to ideological considerations - the Red Army is the strongest in the world, it needs to hide.

So, the Red Army, having a numerical and sometimes even qualitative advantage, was absolutely not prepared for war. Moreover, in such a situation, the created multiple numerical advantage was only worse for the attackers. Many factors were not taken into account, the main one

of which - weather. Fanaticism imposed on soldiers and commanders instead of fortitude created new problems.

On the Finnish side, almost the entire army was involved in the war. This is from 14 infantry divisions (that is, 265 thousand soldiers), only 30 tanks and 130 aircraft. That is, the Finns were inferior in infantry by 4 times, in aircraft by 29 times, and in tanks by 100 times. The Finns also had fewer guns, and these were mainly light mortars. Finland had enough supplies for an effective war for two months...

The Finnish division had much less equipment compared to the Soviet one. These were 11 - 11.5 thousand soldiers. As in the USSR army, riflemen predominated (11 thousand rifles). The Finns used modifications of the famous Berdanka rifle, created in 1870 in the USA. There were also fewer machine gunners in the division - about a hundred. The main advantage of the Finnish division over the Soviet one was its elite fighters armed with automatic rifles (250 units). There were about 30-50 guns of various calibers, about 12 mortars.

The Finnish army was inferior in almost all respects. Their tactics and ability to use absolutely everything against the enemy amazed tacticians all over the world.

The Finns used not only their own advantages, but also even the advantages of the enemy. Numerical superiority turned against the USSR on the well-thought-out defensive lines of the Finns, technical superiority resulted in a large number of non-combat losses in areas swamped by the Finns.

The Finns fought a guerrilla war, and these were not civilians, but specially trained sabotage detachments (analogous to the American Rangers), whose goal was to inflict the greatest damage on the enemy in his rear. The saboteurs disabled tanks and even planes at bases, intercepted convoys with ammunition and fuel, killed staff commanders, blew up bridges and warehouses, and simply destroyed enemy personnel. The partisans moved on skis; after striking, they retreated in an orderly manner.

Winter War is also known for its snipers. Hiding in a tree or other convenient position, the Finnish sniper waited for hours for the enemy. When an enemy convoy, patrol, or simply a group of opponents was detected, he fired two or three accurate shots at a great distance, and then changed position or quickly skied into the forest, where after a snowfall it was almost impossible to find him...

Finnish artillerymen are also known for their actions. Using light artillery (mortars), they could quickly shoot ammunition onto the heads of opponents and change position before they were discovered. Although Finland had fewer artillery pieces, their artillery was more effective than the Soviet one. According to the recollections of eyewitnesses, if the Soviet artillerymen could not even approximately determine the location of the Finnish guns, then the Finns hit the Russian batteries with the third shot - “The first shell was undershot, the second shell was overshoot, the third shell exactly covered our gun.” This is explained by the adjustment of the fire of Finnish guns by Finnish gunners, under whose supervision most of the positions of the Soviet troops were.

The Mannerheim Line is a complex of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus, created to defend Finland from Soviet aggression. The length of the line is about 135 km, width (depth) from 45 to 90 km.

Construction of the line began in 1918 and continued until 1939. The first project involved the construction of a relatively small defensive line to defend a railway line. However, it was decided to increase the scale of the project and extend the line to almost the entire border with the USSR.

The creation of the line was led by the German colonel Baron von Barndestein and directly by Karl Gustav Mannerheim himself. 300,000 marks were allocated for construction; Finnish and German sappers, as well as Soviet prisoners of war, worked.

In fact, only Mannerheim was involved in the main construction planning, and there were relatively few German sappers. For the marshal, something else was important - these events improved relations between Finland and Germany and worsened relations between Germans and Russians. This increased the chances that in the future Germany would act on the side of the Finns against the USSR.

As already mentioned, Mannerheim studied many defensive lines around the world and had enormous knowledge on the construction of defensive lines. And although the concentration of guns, trenches, bunkers and bunkers was much less than, for example, on Maginot, the line was no less effective - the emphasis was on the depth of defense and the tactical location of firing points.

The Mannerheim Line consisted of several defensive lines. Even before the zone of destruction of the Finnish guns, stones were placed and barbed wire was strung. Barbed wire hampered the advance of infantry, and rocks impeded the advance of tanks. The principle of operation was simple and ingenious - the tank ran over one cobblestone with one caterpillar track, while the other remained on the ground. As a result, the tank either lost its tracks or completely overturned. The only tank capable of crossing such a line due to its rather high landing, the BT-5, had too weak armor, so it was most likely shot at from anti-tank guns in front. The first line was bunkers located in a checkerboard pattern and connected by trenches (this made it possible to supply ammunition and reinforcements where needed). It was difficult to distinguish the bunkers from an ordinary hill or hillock - due to the age of construction, natural camouflage arose at the firing points. Two bunkers - in the west and east - were located on the front flank, and the central firing point was on the rear flank. As a result, the entire territory ahead was within the radius of machine gun fire from at least one of the machine guns, and if the attack was in the center, then the enemy would even fall under crossfire. Moreover, this arrangement did not allow the enemy to penetrate deep into the defense - suppose a company broke through the first line and destroyed the central firing point on the rear flank, and immediately came under fire from flanking machine guns. The fighters found themselves under heavy fire and were cut off from their own, so they could no longer receive ammunition or reinforcements...

If tanks broke forward, they immediately came under heavy fire from the second line - anti-tank guns. The anti-tank guns were followed by anti-aircraft guns and long-range artillery, and then again by anti-personnel positions, etc. All the lines had pillboxes and bunkers. And if the bunkers were abandoned or occupied again (depending on whether there was an attack or not), then the concrete pillboxes were the permanent residence of the Finnish fighters. They lived there for months and years, had all the conditions for this, even a warehouse with food and ammunition. There was also radio communication with headquarters, machine gun nests and anti-tank rifle nests. The pillbox itself was practically invulnerable even to heavy guns; it could only be taken by infantry, inevitably with heavy losses.
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Most military historians are inclined to think that if the plan of the Chief of the German General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen had been implemented, the First World War could have gone completely as planned. But back in 1906, the German strategist was removed from his post and his followers were afraid to implement Schlieffen’s plan.

Blitz War Plan

At the beginning of the last century, Germany began planning for a major war. This was due to the fact that France, defeated several decades earlier, clearly harbored plans for military revenge. The German leadership was not particularly afraid of the French threat. But in the east, Russia, an ally of the Third Republic, was gaining economic and military power. For Germany there was a real danger of a war on two fronts. Well aware of this, Kaiser Wilhelm ordered von Schlieffen to develop a plan for a victorious war in these conditions

And Schlieffen, in a fairly short time, created such a plan. According to his idea, Germany was supposed to start the first war against France, concentrating 90% of all its armed forces in this direction. Moreover, this war was supposed to be lightning fast. Only 39 days were allotted for the capture of Paris. For final victory – 42.

It was assumed that Russia would not be able to mobilize in such a short period of time. After the victory over France, German troops will be transferred to the border with Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm approved the plan, saying the famous phrase: “We will have lunch in Paris, and we will have dinner in St. Petersburg.”

Failure of the Schlieffen Plan

Helmuth von Moltke, who replaced Schlieffen as chief of the German General Staff, accepted the Schlieffen plan without much enthusiasm, considering it excessively risky. And for this reason, I subjected it to thorough revision. In particular, he refused to concentrate the main forces of the German army on the western front and, for reasons of precaution, sent a significant part of the troops to the east.

But Schlieffen planned to envelop the French army from the flanks and completely encircle it. But due to the transfer of significant forces to the east, the German group of troops on the western front simply did not have enough available funds for this. As a result, the French troops not only were not surrounded, but were also able to deliver a powerful counterattack.

The reliance on the slowness of the Russian army in terms of protracted mobilization also did not justify itself. The invasion of East Prussia by Russian troops literally stunned the German command. Germany found itself in the grip of two fronts.