/ Occupation of the Ruhr

The true content of this diplomatic Occupation document became clear the very next day. On January 11, 1923, detachments of Franco-Belgian troops of several thousand people occupied Essen and its surroundings. A state of siege was declared in the city. The German government responded to these events by recalling by telegraph its ambassador Mayer from Paris, and envoy Landsberg from Brussels. All German diplomatic representatives abroad were instructed to present in detail to the respective governments all the circumstances of the case and to protest against the “violent policy of France and Belgium, contrary to international law.” President Ebert's appeal "To the German People" of January 11 also announced the need to protest "against violence against law and the peace treaty." Germany's formal protest was stated on January 12, 1923, in the German government's response to the Belgian and French note. “The French government,” read the German note, “is trying in vain to disguise a serious violation of the treaty by giving a peaceful explanation for its actions. The fact that the army crosses the border of unoccupied German territory with wartime composition and weapons characterizes France’s actions as a military action.”

“This is not a question of reparations,” Chancellor Cuno said in his speech in the Reichstag on January 13. — This is about an old goal that has been set by French policy for more than 400 years... This policy was most successfully pursued by Louis XIV and Napoleon I; but other rulers of France adhered to it no less clearly to this day.”

British diplomacy continued to remain an outwardly indifferent witness to developing events. She assured France of her loyalty.

The economic situation in Germany in 1922 continued to be extremely difficult. Industrial production was only two-thirds of pre-war levels. Inflation has increased. In April 1922, a gold mark was worth about one and a half thousand, and in January 1923 - more than 11 thousand paper marks. The standard of living of workers fell 4-5 times lower than before the war. The incomes of the middle strata fell catastrophically, their savings in banks turned into worthless pieces of paper.

Speculators paid for goods within the country with depreciated money, and abroad received hard foreign currency for them. Heavy industry magnates - Stinnes, Krupp, Fegler, Wolf and others - increased their capital. From 1919 to 1923, large capitalists exported 12 billion gold marks abroad.

"The children of Germany are starving!" Lithograph by K. Kollwitz. 1924

The concentration of production and capital increased. Created by Stinnes in the fall of 1921, the grand Siemens-Rhein-Elbe-Schuckert-Union trust had 1,220 industrial, banking and trading enterprises in 1923, owned forests and sawmills, shipping companies and shipyards, hotels, restaurants, and newspapers. Stinnes' economic interests extended to Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Brazil, and Indonesia. His fortune was estimated at 8-10 billion gold marks. His “empire” employed 600 thousand people.

The country's agriculture continued to deteriorate. From year to year, crop yields fell, the harvest of grains and potatoes decreased, and the number of livestock decreased. The poorest peasantry suffered especially; unable to buy fertilizers and feed for livestock, it suffered great hardships and went bankrupt.

Since May 1921, the post of Chancellor of Germany was held by one of the leaders of the Catholic Center Party, I. Wirth. A prominent member of his cabinet (Minister of Reconstruction and then Minister of Foreign Affairs) was W. Rathenau. Wirth and Rathenau believed that Germany should faithfully fulfill its reparation obligations. At the same time, reflecting the interest of a certain part of the industrial bourgeoisie in weakening Germany’s dependence on the victorious countries, they stood for the establishment of close economic ties and normal political relations with Soviet Russia. Therefore, the German government signed the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, which strengthened Germany’s international position and created ample opportunities for German-Soviet economic cooperation. However, such a foreign policy line met with opposition from heavy industry magnates and farmers.

With the funds of monopolists and cadets, reactionary and fascist organizations were planted, which included former officers and non-commissioned officers, bourgeois youth, part of the bureaucracy and the petty bourgeoisie, and declassed elements. They sought the liquidation of the Weimar Republic, the defeat of the Communist Party and other progressive forces, the establishment of an open dictatorship of monopoly capital and the transition to an aggressive foreign policy. Chauvinistic demonstrations, intimidation and murder became the main means to achieve these goals. Munich was the center of the fascist party that emerged in 1919. To deceive the workers, it called itself the National Socialist German Workers' Party; since 1921 it was headed by Hitler.

In Chemnitz, the Nazis staged a demonstration under the slogan “For God, the Kaiser and the Empire,” which ended in a bloody clash with the workers. In Munich, the Nazis publicly burned the banner of the republic. An attempt was made on E. Thälmann's life in Hamburg. Fascist gangs also attacked some representatives of the bourgeoisie - supporters of bourgeois democracy and moderate foreign policy. In August 1921, Erzberger, who signed the Compiegne Armistice on behalf of Germany, was killed, and in June 1922, Rathenau, who signed the Treaty of Rapallo.

The working class demanded an end to terrorist activities and reactionary provocations. In the summer of 1922, 150 thousand workers demanded the dissolution of fascist organizations in Cologne, 80 thousand in Kiel, 150 thousand in Düsseldorf, 200 thousand in Leipzig and 300 thousand in Hamburg. A powerful demonstration took place in Berlin, in which 750 thousand people participated. But the protests remained without consequences. The government did not take action against the Nazis.

In the fight against fascism, the activity of trade unions intensified, and the influence of communists grew. It was especially strong in the factory committees of metalworkers, builders, and woodworkers. The leadership of the Social Democratic Party and trade unions began to seek the exclusion of revolutionary workers from factory committees in order to keep these organizations in positions of cooperation with the bourgeoisie. But then new, revolutionary factory committees began to emerge. The First All-German Congress of Revolutionary Factory Committees, held in November 1922, declared the need to form a workers' government and arm the working class.

As a result of the aggravation of the internal political situation and pressure from extremely reactionary groups, Wirth's cabinet fell, and in November 1922 Cuno, a protege of the Stinnes group, formed a government of representatives of the People's Party, the Democratic Party and the Catholic Center Party. Cuno was closely connected with American capital as the general director of the Hapag shipping company, which had an agreement with the American concern Harriman, and as a member of the supervisory board of the German-American Petroleum Society, which was part of the Rockefeller trust.

Occupation of the Ruhr

At the London Conference of 1921, the victorious powers established the amount of German reparations at 132 billion gold marks. The financial ruin that reigned in Germany made it increasingly difficult to pay them. But the French government insisted on full and accurate payment of reparation payments, despite the difficult situation of the German economy and finances. France viewed the weakening of Germany as a guarantee of its security and ensuring its hegemony in Europe. Therefore, when England, at the Paris Reparations Conference convened in early 1923, proposed reducing the size of reparations to 50 billion marks and providing Germany with a moratorium (deferment of payments) for four years, France raised strong objections, and the conference was disrupted.

Following this, France, having agreed with Belgium, decided to occupy the Ruhr. The reason for this was Germany’s violation of the deadline for the supply of coal and timber. The occupation of the Ruhr, according to the plans of the French ruling circles, should have led to the full collection of reparations, and ultimately to the separation of some territories from Germany. In this way, France hoped to achieve what it failed to achieve in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference.

On January 11, 1923, a hundred thousand strong Franco-Belgian army entered the Ruhr and occupied it. 10% of Germany's population lived in the occupied territory, 88% of coal was mined and a significant amount of iron and steel was produced.

Cuno's government proclaimed a policy of "passive resistance". Enterprises seized by the occupiers, as well as all others that could benefit the occupiers, had to stop working. Residents of the Ruhr were forbidden to pay taxes and carry out the orders of the occupation authorities, transport their goods and send correspondence. Through “passive resistance,” the ruling circles of Germany hoped to cause damage to the occupiers and at the same time show the German people that the government was fighting for their interests. In fact, the occupation and the disasters it caused turned into a source of profit for the monopolists.

Ruhr industrialists enjoyed significant subsidies from the state in the form of compensation for carrying out “passive resistance”. Stinnes, Kirdorff, Thyssen and Krupp received 360 million gold marks for wages to miners, 250 million in compensation for material costs and 700 million for “lost profits.” But the owners paid the workers with devalued paper money. In July 1923, the gold mark was worth 262 thousand paper marks, and on November 5 - 100 billion paper marks. At the end of the year, there were 93 trillion paper marks in circulation.

In connection with the occupation of the Ruhr, the German bourgeoisie put forward the slogan “the fatherland is in danger.” Speaking later about this “patriotism” of the German capitalists, E. Thälmann noted that for them it was not about the interests of the nation, not about the fate of the fatherland, but about profits in hard cash, about the largest share of participation in the exploitation of the Rhine and Ruhr proletariat.

England and the United States supported a policy of "passive resistance", hoping that it would lead to the weakening of both France and Germany. England was especially interested in undermining French positions on the European continent, and American capitalists expected that Germany would turn to them for help and they would have the opportunity not only to take control of the German economy and finances, but also to achieve dominant influence in Europe.

The Soviet government protested against the occupation of the Ruhr. On January 13, 1923, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted an appeal “To the peoples of the whole world in connection with the occupation of the Ruhr region by France,” which stated: “In these decisive days, workers’ and peasants’ Russia again raises its voice of protest against the insane policies of imperialist France and its allies Again and with particular energy she protests against the suppression of the right of the German people to self-determination."

On January 29, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions decided to provide material support to Ruhr workers in the amount of 100 thousand rubles. gold. The All-Russian Union of Miners sent 10 thousand rubles. gold and 160 wagons of grain. The miners of the Urals came out

went to work on Sunday and gave all their earnings to the Ruhr workers. Workers at the Kharkov automobile and locomotive factories contributed 2% of their monthly earnings. The peasants of the Vyatka province contributed 3 thousand pounds of grain to the fund to help German workers. 1,400 tons of rye and two steamships with food were sent from other provinces and regions.

In March 1923, the congress of factory workers of the Rhine-Ruhr industrial region, on behalf of 5 million workers, adopted a message to the working people of the Soviet country with warm gratitude for the fraternal solidarity they expressed. “The money and bread you sent will be our weapons in a difficult struggle on two fronts - against insolent French imperialism and against the German bourgeoisie.” The message said that the struggle of Soviet workers “is for us a shining beacon in our difficult daily struggle.”

Help also came from workers in London, Amsterdam, Prague, Rome, Warsaw, and Paris. Communists from many countries opposed the occupation of the Ruhr. On January 6-7, 1923, representatives of the communist parties of France, England, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia and Germany held a conference in Essen at which they protested against the threat of occupation of the Ruhr. The manifesto adopted by the conference said: “Workers of Europe! The communist parties and trade unions belonging to the Red International of Trade Unions openly and clearly declare what they have stated more than once: they are ready, together with all workers’ organizations, to fight for a joint resistance to the threats and danger of the capitalist offensive and a new world war.”

Workers throughout Germany contributed 10% of their wages to the “Ruhr relief fund.”

Growing revolutionary crisis in Germany

On the very first day of the entry of Franco-Belgian troops into the Ruhr, the German communists began to fight against the invaders. On January 11, 1923, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany addressed an appeal to the German people and to the leadership of the Social Democratic Party and trade unions. The appeal pointed out that the Cuno government was to blame for the misfortunes of the working class and the current situation, and proposed organizing a united front to fight against the occupation and to overthrow the Cuno government. The leaders of the Social Democratic Party and trade unions rejected this proposal. They called for “patriotic unity” and the conclusion of a “civil peace” with the bourgeoisie. Thus, enormous harm was done to the cause of the struggle of the German people against the occupation, which was aggravated by the fact that the Social Democratic Party still had great influence on the workers and used it against the interests of the working class.

The forces of the revolution were also weakened by the fact that the opportunists Brandler and Thalheimer, who headed the Central Committee of the Communist Party, considered the united front of the working class as a bloc of the KKE with the top of social democracy, and the creation of a workers’ government was considered possible only through an agreement with this top, even on the condition of refusal from the most important principles of the class struggle.

Brandler and Thalheimer also pursued their opportunist line at the VIII Congress of the Communist Party, held in Leipzig on January 28 - February 1, 1923. E. Thälmann, V. Pick, K. Zetkin and others opposed this line. Thälmann declared that the entry of communists into the workers' government should be a means of preparing the defeat of the bourgeoisie, and the workers' government should become the embryo of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Nevertheless, Brandler and his like-minded people managed to include in the congress resolution the wording that the workers’ government is an attempt by the working class to pursue workers’ politics within the framework of bourgeois democracy. This attitude disoriented the German proletariat.

In its address to the international proletariat and workers of Germany, the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party explained that the occupation of the Ruhr was inspired by the German and French monopolies, which were reducing Germany to the status of an Entente colony. The party called on the German and French proletariat to jointly fight for the emancipation of the working class.

Throughout Germany, mass demonstrations and strikes took place demanding the expulsion of the occupiers, the resignation of the Cuno government as a government of “national betrayal,” and an increase in the living standards of the working people. More and more layers of the working class were drawn into the struggle. On March 9, Dortmund miners went on strike. At the end of April and on May Day, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Berlin spoke out under the slogans: “Down with fascism!”, “Union with Soviet Russia!”

The Cuno government, supported by all bourgeois parties and the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, intensified its attack on the workers. On April 18, an unemployed demonstration in Mülheim was shot at and eight people were killed. At the same time, repressions against the leaders of the Communist Party intensified. The commission of the Prussian Landtag decided to deprive V. Pick of parliamentary immunity for his participation in distributing proclamations among soldiers. On May 5, 17 communist deputies of the Prussian Landtag were removed from the Landtag building with the help of the police. At the call of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 100 thousand workers of Berlin took part in the protest demonstration.

The popular movement grew. In May, a strike broke out in the mining and metallurgical industry of the Ruhr, involving 400 thousand people. Armed fighting took place in Gelsenkirchen and the workers took possession of the town hall. In June, 100 thousand workers in Silesia went on strike. On July 29, an anti-fascist day was held in Germany on the initiative of the Communist Party. Millions of people came out to demonstrate.

Agricultural workers also took part in the revolutionary struggle. In Schleswig-Holstein, farm laborers on 60 estates stopped working. 120 thousand agricultural workers in Silesia fought for their rights for four weeks.

Attempts by fascists and reactionary elements to organize provocations and raids on communists were rebuffed by proletarian fighting squads - the “proletarian hundreds.” They were created at the beginning of 1923 on the initiative of the revolutionary factory committees of Berlin. By May 1923, there were about 300 such squads in the country. 25 thousand armed vigilantes came out to the May Day demonstration in Berlin. The Prussian Minister of the Interior, Social Democrat Severing, banned revolutionary factory committees and combat squads, but this ban remained on paper.

On August 11, the Berlin Conference of Factory Committees opened. It was attended by 2 thousand delegates. The conference decided to hold a three-day general strike with the following demands: the immediate resignation of the Cuno government, the confiscation of all food supplies, the lifting of the ban on proletarian militias, the establishment of a minimum hourly wage of 60 pfennig in gold terms, the lifting of the state of emergency, the immediate release of political prisoners. The next day, August 12, a general strike began. The number of strikers reached 3 million people. The united labor front was established in practice.

On the first day of the strike, the Cuno government fell. It was replaced by a coalition government of Stresemann, the leader of the People's Party, which included four Social Democrats. Describing the current situation, Stresemann said that “the government is sitting on a volcano.” However, the German Communist Party failed to take advantage of the favorable situation for the struggle. Brandler and Thalheimer did not put forward a clear political goal for the strike and did nothing to force the Social Democrats to form a workers' government. On August 14, the general strike ended.

Meanwhile, the hunger and poverty that reigned in the country intensified. Over 60% of the workers were partially or completely unemployed; a week's wages were enough for no more than two days. Thousands of hungry people wandered through the fields in search of grain and potatoes.

In the Rhineland and Ruhr, separatists led by the banker Hagen and the burgomaster of Cologne Konrad Adenauer became more active. They were now trying to do what they had failed to achieve in 1919 - to break away the Rhineland and Ruhr from Germany. Adenauer, who repeatedly stated that he stood for the defense of national interests, in fact led a group of the German bourgeoisie ready to split Germany. The separatists planned for September 1923 to proclaim the “Rhine Republic”. The Bavarian separatists also raised their heads; they relied on the monarchist-minded military and fascist organizations that threatened to march on Berlin, Ruhr, Saxony, Thuringia and other centers of the revolutionary movement. The plans of the separatists were thwarted by the working class, which organized powerful demonstrations and performances of fighting squads in defense of German unity.

In conditions of the revolutionary crisis, the influence of the Social Democratic Party fell. At the end of 1922 it had 1.5 million members, and by the end of 1923 no more than half that number remained; At many meetings, resolutions of no confidence in the party leadership were passed. Meanwhile, the influence of the Communist Party grew. Its numbers increased from 225 thousand members in January 1923 to 400 thousand in the fall of the same year. The party published 42 daily newspapers and a number of magazines, had 20 printing houses and its own bookstores.

But the opportunists who headed the leadership of the Communist Party did not prepare the working class for decisive battles with the bourgeoisie. Not even an attempt was made to rely on the revolutionary forces of the village. At the end of August, the district party conference of the Primorsky district, led by E. Thälmann, addressed the Central Committee with a proposal to give instructions on immediate preparations for an armed struggle to gain political power. Brandler rejected this demand, threatening Thälmann with expulsion from the party. The Brandlerites did not have a majority in the Central Committee, but skillfully used the conciliatory position of some of its members and the inexperience of others.

In September 1923, the Central Committee nevertheless formed a permanent Military Council. He began arming the proletarian fighting squads and developed a plan of struggle, which, however, provided for an uprising only in Central Germany and Hamburg; the importance of workers' centers such as the Ruhr and Berlin was underestimated.

Frightened by the growth of revolutionary forces, the bourgeoisie began to prepare for open action against the working class. On September 12, at a meeting of the parliamentary faction of the People's Party, Steenness said: “In two weeks we will have a civil war... we need to carry out executions in Saxony and Thuringia. Don’t miss a single day, otherwise the street will overthrow Stresemann’s cabinet.” The government began to look for ways to come to an agreement with the French imperialists. On September 27, it abandoned further “passive resistance” without presenting any conditions to the occupiers. “We stopped the passive resistance,” Stresemann later wrote, “because it had completely exploded on its own, and if we continued to finance it it would only plunge us into Bolshevism.”

Stresemann's government received emergency powers from the Reichstag and used them to impose a state of siege, ban strikes and abolish the 8-hour working day. Reichswehr forces and fascist organizations were put on alert.

Workers' governments in Saxony and Thuringia

The offensive of the reaction especially aggravated the political situation in Saxony and Thuringia, highly developed industrial regions. In Saxony, the ratio of the number of industrial workers to the total number of amateur population was the highest for the entire country. The third part of the fighting squads was concentrated there (by this time in Germany there were already about 800 “proletarian hundreds”, which consisted of up to 100 thousand people).

The Social Democrats in power in these lands were forced to come to an agreement with the communists. On October 10, 1923, a workers' government was formed in Saxony, consisting of five left-wing Social Democrats and two communists. On October 16, a workers' government with communist participation was also formed in Thuringia.

The situation fully justified the entry of the communists into the government together with the left social democrats. The idea of ​​a workers' or workers' and peasants' government embraced the masses. The movement for the creation of such a government has gained serious momentum in rural areas. The conference of the small tenants' union in Halle adopted a resolution demanding the creation of a workers' and peasants' government. At a conference of representatives of unions of peasants and small tenants in Weimar, a united organization emerged, numbering up to 1 million people and setting itself the task of fighting jointly with the working class for the formation of a workers' and peasants' government. However, while participating in the governments of Saxony and Thuringia, the communists did not demonstrate revolutionary independence. They could use their positions to arm the proletariat, establish control over banks and production, disband the police, replacing them with armed workers' militia, improve the financial situation of the working people, and encourage the revolutionary activity of the working class and peasantry. Instead, the communists - members of the Saxon and Thuringian governments - “behaved,” G. Dimitrov later said, “like ordinary parliamentary ministers within the framework of bourgeois democracy).

At the same time, the Brandlerites did not take the necessary measures to organize the masses for struggle throughout the country. The workers' forces turned out to be scattered, strikes took place without mutual communication. All this helped the ruling circles of Germany prepare the defeat of the Saxon and Thuringian governments.

On October 13, 1923, the Reichswehr command in Saxony declared the “proletarian hundreds” disbanded. An army of sixty thousand was transferred to the borders of Saxony within two days by order of Ebert. On October 21, Reichswehr troops entered Leipzig, Dresden and other centers of Saxony.

During these critical days, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany decided to call the proletariat for a general strike, which was then to develop into an armed uprising. It was planned that the workers of Hamburg would be the first to speak out on October 23. On October 20, a conference of Saxony factory committees met in Chemnitz to declare a strike. On the eve of its opening, the leadership of the Communist Party informed the secretaries of the district party committees who arrived in Chemnitz about their decision. However, at the conference, the question of a general strike was, at the insistence of the Social Democrats and Brandlerites, “transferred to the commission” and thus buried, and after the conference closed, Brandler notified all district party organizations that the armed uprising was cancelled. With this treacherous act, the Brandlerites thwarted assistance to the Hamburg proletariat, which by the time the decision on an armed uprising was canceled had already begun the struggle.

Hamburg uprising

On October 21, the workers of the Hamburg shipyards at their conference decided to call for a general strike if the Reichswehr opened military action against the workers' government of Saxony. The next day, when it became known that the Reichswehr troops had entered Saxony, a general strike began in Hamburg. At the same time, the Hamburg organization of the Communist Party received instructions from the Central Committee to begin an armed uprising on October 23.

Following this decision, the District Party Committee scheduled the uprising for 5 a.m. on October 23. On the night of October 23, an appeal from the All-German Committee of Factory Committees was distributed in Hamburg, calling on the country's working class for a general strike in connection with the reprisal of government troops against the workers of Saxony and Thuringia.

The appeal said: “The decisive hour has come. One of two things: either the working people will save Central Germany, turn Germany into a workers’ and peasants’ republic, which will enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union, or a terrible disaster will come.”

At dawn on October 23, workers occupied 17 police stations, armed themselves, and began building barricades. Thousands of workers joined the struggle. At the head of the revolutionary forces was the Hamburg organization of the Communist Party, led by Thälmann, numbering 18 thousand people. The communists, many ordinary Social Democrats and non-party people fought shoulder to shoulder. Under the leadership of Willy Bredel, members of the Communist Youth League provided selfless assistance to the rebels.

The bourgeoisie fled the city in panic. The Senate, the majority of which belonged to the Social Democrats, as well as the leaders of the reformist trade unions opposed the uprising. Large forces of the army, police, and armed detachments of the bourgeoisie fell upon the rebels. The government ordered the Reichswehr units stationed in Schwerin to enter Hamburg.

On October 24, after two days of battles, the forces of the rebels began to weaken. Help did not come from other places, since by this time it became known that the Brandlerites had canceled the decision on an all-German uprising. Upon learning of this, Thälmann gave the order to stop the battle. On October 25, observing strict discipline, the rebels withdrew from the battle. The White Terror began in Hamburg. People were grabbed on the streets and killed without trial. The communist organization was banned and its property was confiscated.

The defeat of the Hamburg proletariat was a signal for the onset of reaction throughout the country. By order of Stresemann, Reichswehr troops occupied government buildings in Dresden, and on October 30 the workers' government in Saxony ceased to exist; On November 12, the workers' government of Thuringia was dispersed. General Seeckt, having received emergency powers from the government, organized the persecution of the communists. November 23, 1923 The German Communist Party was banned.

Thus ended the political crisis of 1923 in Germany. Having created a directly revolutionary situation, it did not, however, lead to a proletarian revolution. The main reason for this was the lack of unity in the German working class. The leaders of the Social Democratic Party and trade unions betrayed the interests of the working masses and contributed to strengthening the positions of the imperialist bourgeoisie. There were opportunists in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Deprived of genuine militant leadership, the German proletariat could not resist the powerful onslaught of the bourgeois state and the forces of reaction.

The period of revolutionary upsurge is over. The bourgeoisie celebrated victory. However, this did not break the will of the German working class to continue the struggle. The defeat in Hamburg was, as Thälmann wrote, “a thousand times more fruitful and valuable for future class battles than a retreat without a single blow of the sword.”

September popular uprising in Bulgaria

The coming to power in June 1923 of the government of A. Tsankov meant the establishment of a fascist regime in Bulgaria and the beginning of a civil war. Spontaneous mass uprisings broke out in many areas against the military-terrorist dictatorship of Tsankov. In the Pleven and Shumen districts, about 100 thousand peasants and workers took part in them. Uprisings also covered Plovdiv, Vrachansky, Tarnovo and other districts.

The Bulgarian Communist Party took a position of neutrality in the outbreak of the civil war, believing that there was a struggle between two groups of the bourgeoisie. This led to the fact that the party missed, as G. Dimitrov later said, an extremely favorable situation for the complete defeat of the monarcho-fascist forces at the very beginning of their offensive.

The Nazis made mass arrests. On June 14, they captured and killed Alexander Stamboliysky, the head of the democratic government they overthrew, the leader of the Agricultural Union. In Pleven, 95 communists who took part in the June uprising were put on trial. One of them, A. Khalagev, was killed before the trial, which did not stop the Nazis from sentencing him to death by hanging. The fascist court handed down the same sentence to Atanas Katsamunsky and Nikola Gergalov, and sentenced the rest of the accused to various terms of imprisonment. Numerous arrests were made among trade union activists and among peasants. Those arrested were subjected to severe torture.

Under the influence of the strengthened revolutionary wing led by G. Dimitrov and V. Kolarov, the Bulgarian Communist Party began to develop a new political line. The Executive Committee of the Comintern helped the Bulgarian communists to abandon their erroneous assessment of the fascist coup. In a telegram to the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, he condemned the position taken by the party during the June events, and indicated that in the current conditions it was necessary to launch a struggle against the Tsankov government and wage it together with the Agricultural Union. “Otherwise, the government, having strengthened itself, will defeat the Communist Party. Seriously discuss the current situation, remember the tactics of the Bolsheviks at the time of the Kornilov rebellion and act without hesitation,” the telegram said.

On August 5-7, 1923, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party decided to prepare an armed uprising to overthrow the fascist regime. At the same time, however, a serious mistake was made: despite the fact that the organizing secretary of the Central Committee Todor Lukanov objected to the uprising, he was not removed from his leadership post.

The party began preparations for an uprising. The main attention was paid to the accumulation of weapons, the creation of military revolutionary committees, and propaganda in the army and among the peasantry. In a short time, thirty machine guns and several thousand rifles were purchased.

Seeking unity of anti-fascist forces, the Communist Party turned to the Agricultural Union, Social Democratic and Radical parties with a proposal to form a united front against fascism. In a letter sent to the Social Democratic Party, the Central Committee of the Communist Party wrote: “We ask you - do you agree to abandon the coalition with the bourgeois parties and capitalists and begin a friendly struggle as a united labor front, together with the Communist Party, with the workers and peasants fighting under her banner? Ordinary Social Democrats supported the Communists' proposal, but the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, under all sorts of pretexts, avoided forming an anti-fascist front.

The communists managed to establish unity of action only with the organizations of the Agricultural Union. The united front program formulated by the Communist Party provided for the creation of a workers' and peasants' government, the transfer of land to working peasants, the defense of the interests of the proletariat, the dissolution of all fascist organizations, the restoration of democratic freedoms, the fight against high costs and profiteering, shifting the burden of war reparations to the capitalists, and maintaining peace with all peoples and the establishment of friendly relations with Soviet Russia. The reactionaries, in turn, prepared for struggle. In order to consolidate the reactionary forces, the fascist organization “People's Conspiracy” united a number of bourgeois parties, after which one ruling fascist party “Democratic Conspiracy” was formed. The government embarked on the path of open terror against the communists. On September 12, raids were carried out throughout Bulgaria on the premises of the Communist Party and the apartments of communists. About two and a half thousand of the most active party workers were arrested, clubs were destroyed, communist newspapers were banned, trade union associations were outlawed, and martial law was introduced. However, the fascists failed to capture the leaders of the Communist Party. Only the political secretary of the Central Committee, Hristo Kabakchiev, was arrested, after which the organizational secretary Lukanov took over his post.

Lukanov single-handedly canceled the general political strike planned for September 14 to protest against the terrorist acts of the fascist government.

The workers responded to the government's provocations with revolutionary actions. Spontaneous uprisings against the fascist government broke out in different parts of the country. On September 19, workers and peasants of the Stara Zagorsk district rose up. They captured the city of Nova Zagora and many villages in the district. In the village of Myglizh and some others, workers' and peasants' power was proclaimed. However, the rebels did not have a unified leadership, and as a result of three days of bloody battles, they were defeated by troops that the government was able to transfer from other districts.

In the midst of these events, on September 20, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, after a long struggle with the opportunist group of Lukanov, a directive was adopted to begin a general armed uprising on September 23. Later, speaking about the reasons that prompted this decision, Kolarov and Dimitrov wrote: “At this critical moment, when the government strangled any possibility of legal struggle and the masses of the people rose up spontaneously in many places, the Communist Party was faced with the test: to abandon the masses that had risen to fight without leadership, which would lead to the defeat of the revolutionary forces piecemeal, or take their side, try to unite the movement and give it a unified political and organizational leadership; Although the Communist Party was aware of the weight of the difficulties of the struggle and the shortcomings of the organization, but, being a party of working people, it could not take any other position than to stand up for the cause of the people, speaking together with the Agricultural Union, and call for an uprising on September 23.”

From the very beginning it was determined that the uprising would not be general. In Sofia, on September 21, the police arrested several members of the military revolutionary committee created there, and those who remained at large sent out a directive throughout the Sofia district to postpone the uprising. The treacherous activities of opportunists in the Plovdiv, Rusen, Burgas, Varna, and Shumen district committees of the Communist Party also slowed down the organization of the uprising. In some areas of Southern and Northeastern Bulgaria, uprisings did occur, but the government managed to suppress them one by one.

The situation was different in the northwestern part of the country, where preparations were better and where the military revolutionary committee headed by G. Dimitrov, V. Kolarov and G. Genov operated. The popular uprising here began on the night of September 24. It has gained great momentum. For several days, the rebel forces were masters of almost all of Northwestern Bulgaria and defeated government troops in a number of places. In some areas, power passed to revolutionary workers' and peasants' committees.

The Nazis gathered all their forces, transferred troops from other districts, mobilized officers and non-commissioned officers of the reserve, as well as the Russian White Guards-Wrangelites who were in Bulgaria. Having launched a broad offensive against the rebels, government troops occupied Northwestern Bulgaria by September 30.

The rebel forces dispersed and many rebels emigrated. The regime of fascist dictatorship won in the country. The reaction has intensified. More than 20 thousand workers, peasants, and members of the intelligentsia died as a result of fascist terror.

The heroic September uprising of the Bulgarian people in its significance went far beyond the borders of Bulgaria, being one of the links in the revolutionary crisis that shook capitalist Europe in 1923. It played a huge role in the development of the class consciousness of the Bulgarian proletariat and in the transformation of the Bulgarian Communist Party into a militant, truly Marxist, revolutionary organization. During the September uprising, the foundations of an alliance between the workers and peasants of Bulgaria and strong anti-fascist traditions were formed.

Speech of the workers of Poland in the fall of 1923. Krakow uprising

In the autumn of 1923, inflation, poverty and hunger in Poland assumed enormous proportions. An additional factor that stimulated the struggle of the Polish people was the revolutionary crisis in a number of European countries. At that time, it seemed that bourgeois power would soon collapse in Germany. This increased the confidence of the Polish proletariat in its own strength and in the possibility of uniting its struggle with the revolutionary struggle of the workers of other countries.

In September 1923, under the leadership of the revolutionary-minded Executive Committee of Factory Committees, a strike began among the miners of Upper Silesia, joined by metal workers, railway workers and telegraph workers. At the initiative of the communists, a united front body arose that led the strike - the “Committee of 21”, headed by a prominent figure of the Communist Party J. Wieczorek. The government sent troops to Upper Silesia. Arrests began. Nevertheless, the workers achieved a partial victory - a slight increase in earnings and weekly payment, which was of great importance in conditions of inflation.

In October, the strike wave rose even higher: 408 thousand people went on strike. The ruling circles, having decided to bleed the Communist Party and thereby stop the growth of the revolutionary movement, resorted to provocation. On October 13, government agents blew up a gunpowder warehouse in Warsaw. The authorities blamed the Communist Party for this, arrested 2 thousand communists and other left-wing figures, and closed a number of trade unions. The offensive of the reaction only aggravated the situation in the country.

The congress of the trade union of railway workers, which took place in October, decided to declare a general strike on the railways on October 22. On the appointed day, the workers of the Krakow railway workshops went on strike, then the strike began to spread to large railway junctions and by the end of October covered a significant part of the country. Postal workers joined the railroad workers. On these same days, a general strike of textile workers began. Worker demonstrations took place in many places.

The government declared the railway workers mobilized and introduced field courts, but these repressions did not stop the development of the revolutionary movement. At the beginning of November the revolutionary upsurge reached its highest point. The Communist Party called on the working class to unite its forces to overthrow the reactionary bourgeois-landlord government. The appeal published by the party stated that all workers must take part in the general strike scheduled for November 5, and “not just for demonstration, not for the sake of a one-day action! The general strike must continue until victory!” Under pressure from the masses, the leaders of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and trade unions were forced to agree to declare a general strike in protest against the militarization of the railways and the introduction of courts-martial. However, true to their hesitant tactics, they set a different strike date for the miners and textile workers - November 7th.

On November 5, a general strike began. It affected many parts of the country, but the most tense situation was in Krakow, where workers had been on strike for several weeks. Therefore, the government decided to strike the first blow to the general strike here. Numerous police detachments from Kielce, Lublin, some military units from Poznan and other places were brought to Krakow. Machine guns were placed near the royal Wawel Castle to fire at working-class areas.

On the morning of November 6, police attacked a workers' demonstration and killed two workers. The demonstrators entered into battle. Two companies of soldiers arrived to help the police. Among them were many Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian peasants. The soldiers began to fraternize with the workers and allowed themselves to be disarmed. Then the troops opened fire from the Wawel area, but the workers did not retreat. They drove off the police, repelled the attacks of the lancers; Without sparing their lives, they went against the armored cars and, having captured one of them, hoisted a red banner on it.

Most of Krakow fell into the hands of the rebels. But the spontaneous uprising did not have proper leadership. The arrests that had taken place throughout the country had weakened the Communist Party, and it was unable to lead the uprising and rally the entire Polish proletariat to support it. The rebellious Krakow was helped only by the workers of the nearest industrial areas: on November 6, major street battles took place in the center of the oil industry - Borislaw. The broad masses of workers believed in the leadership of the teaching staff, and the reaction took advantage of this. By agreement with the military command and the Krakow authorities, the leaders of the PPS told the workers that the government had made concessions, and therefore the fight must be stopped. The rebels believed, laid down their arms and dispersed. Arrests and trials of participants in the uprising immediately began.

For several more days, workers, despite police and judicial terror, went out to protest demonstrations. In Krakow, 100 thousand people took part in the funerals of the murdered workers. When the police killed three workers during a demonstration in Borislav, 50 thousand people came to their funeral. However, these speeches could not change anything.

The defeat of the Polish revolutionary forces in 1923 was caused primarily by the split in the working class. The majority of workers followed the opportunistic leadership of the PPP, which did everything possible to prevent the creation of a united workers' front and the transition to revolutionary actions. Trade unions were also influenced by right-wing leaders; revolutionary figures were mainly in the grassroots trade union organizations. The Communist Party, drained of blood by repression, did not occupy leading positions in the trade unions and could not achieve unity of action of the proletariat throughout the country during the Krakow uprising. The revolutionary struggle of the peasantry and oppressed nationalities did not merge with the struggle of the insurgent workers. All this allowed the reaction to suppress the revolutionary actions of the Polish working class. It was also of certain significance that the revolutionary forces in Bulgaria and Germany had been defeated even earlier.

13. Ruhr conflict of 1923. The Dawes Plan and its international significance.

Ruhr conflict- the culmination of the military-political conflict between Germanic and the Franco-Belgian occupation forces in the Ruhr Basin in 1923.

The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 imposed obligations on the Weimar Republic (Germany) to pay reparations to the victorious countries in the First World War. First of all, French President Raymond Poincaré insisted on uncompromising implementation of the provisions of the treaty, defending the economic and political interests of his country. When there were delays in deliveries, French troops entered unoccupied German territory several times. On March 8, 1921, French and Belgian troops occupied the cities of Duisburg and Düsseldorf, located in the Rhineland demilitarized zone, thereby providing a springboard for the further occupation of the entire industrial region in Rhineland-Westphalia. The London Ultimatum of May 5, 1921, established a schedule for the payment of reparations totaling 132 billion gold marks, and in case of refusal, the occupation of the Ruhr region was provided for in response.

In 1922, given the deteriorating economic situation in the Weimar Republic, the Allies abandoned cash reparations, replacing them with payments in kind (steel, timber, coal). On September 26, the Allied reparations commission unanimously recorded the fact that Germany was lagging behind in terms of reparation deliveries. When, on January 9, 1923, the reparations commission declared that the Weimar Republic was deliberately delaying supplies, France used this as an excuse to send troops into the Ruhr Basin.

Between 11 and 16 January 1923, French and Belgian troops numbering initially 60,000 (later up to 100,000) occupied the entire territory of the Ruhr region, taking the coal and coke production facilities there as “production collateral” to secure execution Germany of its reparation obligations. The entry of occupation troops caused a wave of popular anger in the Weimar Republic. The government, led by the non-party Reich Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno, called on the population to “passive resistance.” Payments of reparations were stopped, industry, management and transport were swept by a general strike. France responded to this by imposing 150 thousand fines, which were sometimes accompanied by expulsion from the occupied territory.

During the passive resistance, the German state took over the payment of wages to the workers of the Ruhr region by issuing additional money. This situation could not continue for a long time, since the worsening economic crisis, inflation, production downtime and tax shortages had a negative impact on the German economy.

On September 26, 1923, the new Reich Chancellor Gustav Stresemann was forced to announce the end of passive resistance. Under pressure from the United States and Great Britain, France signed the MIKUM agreement - the Allied Control Commission for the factories and mines of the Ruhr. The occupation of the Ruhr region ended in July-August 1925 in accordance with the 1924 Dawes Plan.

The Dawes Plan of August 16, 1924 established a new procedure for reparation payments to Germany after the First World War, according to which their size was brought into line with the economic capabilities of the Weimar Republic. To get the German economy going, an international loan was simultaneously provided to Germany under the Dawes Plan.

On November 30, 1923, the Reparations Commission decided to create an international committee of experts chaired by Charles Dawes. The experts began work on January 14 and presented their project on April 9. The treaty was signed on August 16, 1924 in London (London Conference 1924) and came into force on September 1, 1924. Its implementation became possible only after overcoming inflation in Germany and brought the Weimar Republic into its heyday - the “golden twenties”.

Implemented primarily under US pressure and thanks to the policies of Gustav Stresemann, the Dawes Plan ensured the restoration of the German economy. Thanks to this plan, the Weimar Republic became able to pay reparations. The victorious powers were able to return the military loans received from the United States. The Dawes Plan was one of the first successes in post-war German foreign policy, giving new impetus to US-European relations.

The Dawes Plan established that in 1924 Germany would pay reparations in the amount of 1 billion gold marks. By 1928, the amount of payments should reach 2.5 billion. Thanks to protected tranches, the risks associated with the purchase of foreign currency fell on the recipient, which helped maintain the stability of the Reichsmark.

Reparations were paid from directly transferred customs and tax revenues, as well as from interest and redemption of industrial bonds in the amount of 16 billion gold marks. To ensure payments, the Reichsbank and the Imperial Railways were placed under international control.

When, on January 9, 1923, the reparations commission declared that the Weimar Republic was deliberately delaying supplies, France used this as an excuse to send troops into the Ruhr Basin. Between January 11 and January 16, 1923, French and Belgian troops, initially numbering 60,000, occupied the entire Ruhr region, taking the coal and coke production facilities there as “production collateral” to ensure Germany fulfilled its reparations obligations. As a result of the occupation, about 7% of the post-war territory of Germany was occupied, where 72% of coal was mined and more than 50% of iron and steel were produced. However, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Raymond Poincaré, sought to achieve the assignment of the Rhineland and the Ruhr to a status similar to the status of the Saar region, where the ownership of the territory of Germany was only formal, and power was in the hands of the French. The entry of occupation troops caused a wave in the Weimar Republic popular anger. The government, led by Reich Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno, called on the population to “passive resistance.”

The occupation caused discontent on the part of Great Britain and the United States and aggravated problems in Europe. The occupation of the Ruhr region ended in July-August 1925 in accordance with the 1924 Dawes Plan.

Exacerbation of the German problem:

2 factions

1) “Proversals”: ​​exact fulfillment of obligations, cooperation to ease the sanctions regime

2) “Pro-Eastern” - connection with heavy industry, connection of “German intellect” with Russian labor resources and raw materials

Economic problems aggravated contradictions in Germany, a serious increase in anti-Semitic sentiments (the arrival of the wealthy Jewish population from Poland, jewelers, shop owners, shops). The population blamed them for speculative operations

In November 1923: “Munich Putsch” under the slogans of fighting against foreigners, which was suppressed→ 5 years in prison by Hitler.

Dawes Plan of August 16, 1924 established a new procedure for reparation payments to Germany after the First World War, according to which their size was brought into line with the economic capabilities of the Weimar Republic. To start the mechanism of the German economy, according to the Dawes Plan, an international loan was simultaneously provided to Germany.

On November 30, 1923, the Reparations Commission decided to create an international committee of experts chaired by Charles Dawes. The treaty was signed on August 16, 1924 in London (London Conference 1924) and came into force on September 1, 1924. Its implementation became possible only after overcoming inflation in Germany and brought the Weimar Republic into its heyday - the “golden twenties”. Implemented primarily under US pressure and thanks to the policies of Gustav Stresemann, the Dawes Plan ensured the restoration of the German economy.

How As already noted, the instability of the Versailles-Washington system manifested itself in a series of international conflicts and political crises. The most acute of them was the so-called Ruhr crisis, related to the solution of the reparation issue. This crisis reflected both Germany's growing opposition to fulfilling the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the contradictions between its drafters - the Allied powers.

Openly proclaiming the central task of his foreign policy to revise the humiliating decrees of Versailles. Germany in the first post-war period did not have sufficient forces to implement it. Hence the tactics of “hidden counteraction” while simultaneously accumulating economic and military power and attempting to strengthen their international positions. Such tactics included the following areas of activity. In the early 1920s. German government and military circles paid special attention to creating the basis for restoring military potential. According to the doctrine of the Reichswehr commander, General Hans von Seeckt, the “small army” that existed in the Weimar Republic, and especially its 4 thousand-!1b!;; The officer corps was seen as a base for the rapid deployment of large-scale armed forces. In Germany, the Great General Staff continued to function secretly. Military production was almost completely preserved. It is no coincidence that in 1923 Germany came into fourth place in the world (after England, the USA and France) in the export of weapons and military materials.

In order to improve its international position, the German government quite effectively used two means: taking advantage of the contradictions between France and the Anglo-Saxon powers, as well as rapprochement with Soviet Russia. In the first case, Germany managed to enlist the support of England and USA in softening the conditions for reparation payments, in the second - to achieve the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo, which was considered in the Weimar Republic as a kind of leverage over the Allied powers.

The tactics of “hidden counteraction” were most clearly manifested in the execution, a. or rather, in Germany’s failure to fulfill its reparation obligations. By formally adopting the London Reparations Plan. developed at an inter-allied conference in the spring of 1921, the German government began to successfully sabotage it in the fall of that year, citing the extremely difficult financial situation. The expectation of a favorable attitude towards this line of behavior by the British and Americans was completely justified. In June 1922 The International Committee of Bankers, chaired by J. P. Morgan (the Morgan Committee), at a meeting in Paris announced its agreement to provide a loan to Germany subject to a reduction “to reasonable limits” in the amount of reparations it pays. Under pressure from British representatives, the reparations commission liberated the Weimar Republic in October 1922 from cash payments for a period of 8 months. Nevertheless, in November of the same year, the government of K. Wirth sent a note to the commission, which spoke about the insolvency of Germany and put forward a demand to declare a moratorium for 4 years and provide it with large loans.

For obvious reasons, this course of events Not suited France. At the beginning of January 1923, the French Prime Minister R. Poincaré issued an ultimatum from two

->ntov. Firstly, he demanded the establishment of strict con- Gul over the finances, industry and foreign trade of Germany, labs to force her to regularly make reparation contributions. Secondly, the Prime Minister said that in the event of an emergency

"single failure to pay reparations. France on the procedure for applying sanctions occupies Ruhrskaya region. January 9

- "2! reparation commission, and which dominant

- “Were the French playing, I stated non-compliance Hermann-:-< обязательства по поставке угля Франции в счетreparations.

adoring it as “intentional.” In one day. 11January. Franco-Belgian troops entered to the Ruhr.

Thus began the Ruhr crisis, which sharply aggravated the situation both in Germany itself and in the international arena.

The government of V. Cuno, having officially proclaimed a policy of “passive resistance” and calling on the population of the occupied territories to “civil disobedience”, recalled its diplomatic representatives from France and Belgium. General Seeckt in his memorandum advocated a defensive war. The sharp decline in the economy increased social tensions. The danger of new revolutionary explosions in Germany, combined with the threat of further destabilization of the European international order - this was the essence of the Ruhr crisis, which shook the foundations of the Versailles system -

In terms of the development of international relations, the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr had the following consequences. The Ruhr crisis contributed to an even greater spread of revanchist sentiments in Germany, its orientation toward politics from a “position of strength.” The head of the new German government is Gustav Stresemann. a politician of very moderate views, stated: “I have little hope that through negotiations we will create a situation tolerable for us, allowing us to live in within Treaty of Versailles." The already conflictual relations between Germany and France, which in German political circles began to be called “enemy No. 1,” worsened. Events in the Ruhr accelerated the collapse of the Anglo-French Entente, turning the wartime “cordial agreement” into an acute confrontation in resolving German and other issues of the post-war world. In the alarming days of the crisis, the Allied powers could once again see how real the prospect of a Soviet-German rapprochement was, threatening them. Soviet Russia was the only one great powers, which strongly condemned the Franco-Bslgian war action. The VNIK’s appeal to the peoples of the world on January 13, 1923 declared: “The world has again been plunged into a state of pre-war fever. Sparks fly into the powder magazine created from Europe by the Treaty of Versailles.”

The Ruhr conflict was resolved on November 23, 1923, when the Ruhr mine owners and representatives of the Franco-Belgian control commission signed an agreement under which the former pledged to resume coal supplies to France, and the latter to begin withdrawing troops and ending the occupation of the occupied areas. However, this settlement did not address the underlying causes of the crisis, the reparation issue and the German problem as a whole. From the solution to these problems depended not only on further development, but also itself the existence of the Versailles-Washington treaty system.

SECTION II________

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DURING THE TWO STABILIZATION PERIODS

The balance of power on the world stage, the development of international relations in 1924-1929. (general characteristics)

With the entry of capitalist countries into a period of economic and social stabilization, a new stage began in the history of international relations. This stage. being a logical continuation of the previous one, it had the following distinctive features.

In the 1920s the governments of the great powers that won the world war managed to find a common language and develop a coordinated line in resolving the largest international ardently&1em. The consensus reached became the basis for the further development of the Versailles-Washington system. Despite all its inconsistencies, the post-war world order, legally formalized in Paris and Washington, was not only preserved. but also in a certain sense strengthened. In any case, centripetal and constructive forces at that time prevailed over centrifugal and destructive tendencies.

Another characteristic feature of the period under review became widespread dissemination of pacifist ideas and sentiments. Perhaps. Never before have so many peacekeeping projects been put forward and so many conferences been held to ensure peace and international security as in the twenties. It is no coincidence that in historical literature the third decade of the 20th century. often called the "era of pacifism".

Unprecedented popularity of pacifist plans and programs was explained by the action of various factors: tragic consequences of the First World War and the general desire prevent such military conflicts in future: necessity restoration of the destroyed economy and financial system, which assumed stabilization of international relations as the most important condition; activation peacekeeping activities liberal and democratic intelligentsia. as well as the coming to power in a number of European countries of politicians whose foreign policy concept was based on the principles of pacifism (E. Herriot in France. J.R. Maclonald in England, etc.).

However, the most significant reason for the surge in pacifist aspirations lay in the very nature of the international situation that had developed by the mid-1920s. Its uniqueness lay in the fact that the government circles of all the great powers, without exception, although for different reasons, were interested in maintaining the peaceful status quo. The leading victorious powers (USA, England, France) opposed any attempts to forcefully deform the Versad-Washington system, the creators of which they were. The defeated states (primarily Germany), as well as powers that considered themselves “unjustly deprived” of the decisions of the Paris and Washington conferences (Italy and Japan), did not at that time have sufficient power for a military revision of the established international order and used diplomatic, i.e. peaceful means and methods for realizing their foreign policy goals - As for the Soviet Union, its party and state leadership, without abandoning the slogans of proletarian internationalism, concentrated its efforts on strengthening the international positions of the USSR based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Not the least role in the formation of this course was played by the defeat of the “anti-party group” led by L.D. Trotsky, condemnation of its revolutionary maximalism. who denied the very possibility of building socialism in the USSR without the victory of the world revolution. J.V. Stalin, proclaiming the Soviet Union as a “lever” and “base” for the development of the world revolutionary process, defended the independent significance of socialist transformations in the country, which. in turn, required the creation of favorable foreign policy conditions, the maintenance of “world peace” and the normalization of relations with the capitalist powers. These were the real prerequisites for the “era of pacifism.”