Chapter 9. VISTAU-ODERSK OPERATION After the Red Army troops reached the Vistula, captured bridgeheads on the western bank of the river and repelled enemy counterattacks, the front line from the Baltic to the Carpathians stabilized for four months. Both sides were preparing for the decisive

Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation- strategic offensive of Soviet troops on the right flank of the Soviet-German front in 1945. Started on January 12 and ended on February 3. It was carried out by the forces of the 1st Belorussian (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov) and 1st Ukrainian Fronts (Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Konev).

During the Vistula-Oder operation, the territory of Poland west of the Vistula was cleared from German troops and a bridgehead on the right bank of the Oder was captured, which was subsequently used in the attack on Berlin. The operation went down in the military history of mankind as the most rapid offensive - for 20 days, Soviet troops advanced at a distance of 20 to 30 km per day. During this time, they overcame 7 enemy fortified lines and 2 large water obstacles.

Disposition on the eve of the offensive

By January 1945, the German army was in a critical situation. There were heavy battles in Hungary and East Prussia, and the Wehrmacht gradually retreated on the Western Front. During the Iasi-Kishinev operation, the Soviet army captured the Ploiesti oil region (Romania), which was strategically important for Germany. Allied bombing caused serious damage to German industry. The Air Force was practically destroyed and manpower reserves were exhausted. Despite this, in December 1944 the Germans launched a major offensive on the Western Front, Operation Watch on the Rhine, in a final attempt to change the course of the war. By the end of December 1944, the German offensive in the Ardennes ended in complete failure, and on December 25, American troops went on the offensive. By diverting forces to the Western Front, the German command was forced to simultaneously transfer reinforcements for the defense of Koenigsberg to East Prussia and near Budapest, which was surrounded by Soviet troops. As a result, the Vistula front in Poland, which had been stable since the beginning of September 1944, was weakened.

The Soviet command planned to launch an offensive in Poland on January 20, to break through the enemy’s defenses along an area with a total length of 480 kilometers, using the Sandomierz, Magnuszewski and Pulawy bridgeheads. Since the Allied forces were engaged in heavy fighting in the Ardennes, the Soviet headquarters agreed to postpone the operation and launch an offensive from January 12 to 15.

Strengths of the parties

By January 1945, in front of two Soviet fronts there were 3 German armies (28 divisions and 2 brigades) of Army Group A (from January 26 - Army Group Center) - approx. 400 thousand people, 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1200 tanks and assault guns, 600 aircraft. In addition to continuous defensive lines, the Germans created several fortified areas, the largest of which were Modlin, Warsaw, Radom, Krakow, Lodz, Bydgoszcz, Poznan, Breslau and Schneidemühl.

In the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts there were 16 combined arms, 4 tank and 2 air armies: a total of 1.5 million people, 37,033 guns and mortars, 7,042 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5,047 aircraft. The offensive began in conditions of overwhelming superiority in forces and means.

Progress of the operation

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive early in the morning of January 12, delivering the main blow from the Sandomierz bridgehead, and the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front - on January 14 from the Magnuszewski and Pulawy bridgeheads.

Writer Antony Beevor, in his book The Fall of Berlin, wrote about the first day of the operation:

Since, by order of Hitler, tank reserves were advanced to the front line in advance, they found themselves within the range of Soviet artillery fire, suffered serious losses already in the first period of the offensive and could not be used in accordance with pre-developed defense plans, being drawn into the battle to cover gaps, formed in the battle formations of German troops.

On January 13 and 14, further north - in East Prussia - the offensive of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of General Chernyakhovsky and the 2nd Belorussian Front (General Rokossovsky) unfolded (see East Prussian Operation (1945)).

Hitler decided to suspend all active hostilities on the Western Front and return to Berlin from his headquarters in Ziegenberg only on January 15, on the fourth day of the successful Soviet offensive, despite the urgent requests of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Guderian. In the first days, Hitler refused to consider proposals for the transfer of reinforcements to the Eastern Front, but, returning to the capital, he ordered the transfer of the Grossdeutschland corps from East Prussia to the area of ​​​​the city of Kielce, 170 km south of Warsaw.

Meanwhile, the 47th Army, operating on the extreme right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, was outflanking Warsaw from the north. On January 16, the headquarters of Army Group A (commander - Colonel General Joseph Harpe) reported to the command of the Wehrmacht ground forces that it would not be possible to hold the city due to the small size of the garrison (several battalions). Guderian issued an order by which the command of Army Group A was allowed to independently make decisions regarding the continuation of the defense of Warsaw. Hitler, having learned about this, became furious and demanded to cancel the order, but radio contact with the garrison had already been interrupted.

On January 17, Soviet troops liberated Warsaw, in the battles for which units of the People's Army that were part of the 1st Belorussian Front (commanded by Brigadier General Sigmund Berling) took an active part. On the same day, Colonel General Joseph Harpe and the commander of the 9th Wehrmacht Army, General von Lüttwitz, were removed from command of the troops.

Anthony Beevor:

By January 18, the main forces of Army Group A were defeated, the enemy defenses were broken through on a 500-km front to a depth of 100-150 km.

On January 19, the advanced units of the 3rd Guards Tank, 5th Guards and 52nd Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, pursuing the enemy, entered German territory in Upper Silesia, and the troops of the left wing of the front liberated Krakow.

The German command began transferring part of the forces from the interior of Germany, from the Western Front and other sectors of the front to the border areas. However, attempts to restore the broken front were unsuccessful. On January 20-25, the armies of the 1st Belorussian Front overcame the Wartow and Poznan defensive lines and surrounded the 60,000-strong enemy garrison in Poznan. On January 22 - February 3, Soviet troops reached the Oder and captured bridgeheads on its western bank in the areas of Steinau, Breslau, Oppeln and Küstrin. At the same time, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front occupied part of southern Poland and northern Czechoslovakia and advanced to the upper reaches of the Vistula. Fighting broke out for Breslau, where the German group resisted until the beginning of May.

Results

As a result of the Vistula-Oder operation, 35 enemy divisions were completely defeated, another 25 lost from 50 to 70% of their personnel, and about 150 thousand people were captured. Soviet troops leveled the front and reached the distant approaches to Berlin. Significant enemy forces found themselves in pockets in Poznan and Breslau. The inability of the Germans to effectively conduct combat operations on two fronts and the inevitability of the impending Allied victory became obvious. The restoration of Polish statehood began - the national administration was restored in the liberated territories.

The total losses of the Soviet armies amounted to about 160 thousand people, of which about 44 thousand were irrevocable.

Notes

1. ^ Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. No. 250 Received December 24, 1944. PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
2. ^ Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. No. 257 Dispatched January 15, 1945. PERSONAL AND STRICTLY SECRET FROM PREMIER J.V. STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT Mr. F. ROOSEVELT
3. ^ Antony Beevor, "The Fall of Berlin", ch. 2

The start of the Soviet offensive in Poland was scheduled for January 20. But on January 6, in connection with the major failure of the Anglo-American forces in the Ardennes, British Prime Minister W. Churchill turned to J.V. Stalin with a request to provide assistance and urgently carry out an offensive “on the Vistula front or somewhere else.” To support the allies, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had to limit the preparation time for the Vistula-Oder operation, the start of which was postponed to January 12.

THE EFFECT EXCEEDED EXPECTATIONS

On January 12, 1945, the Red Army went on the offensive, which was preceded by powerful artillery bombardment. In breakthrough areas, fire was fired at 250-300 gun barrels per 1 km. Having received a sufficient amount of ammunition, Soviet guns could conduct hurricane shelling like a fiery shaft, which, alternating, was transferred from the front edge of the German defense into its depths.

The effect of the impact exceeded all expectations. This was partly because the Germans had moved their reserves closer to the front line, and they found themselves in the zone of devastating artillery fire. Therefore, already at the first powerful blow of the attackers, not only the divisions of the first echelon were defeated, but also quite strong reserves. This led to the rapid collapse of the entire German defense system. The presence of large mobile reserves ensured the Red Army's rapid advance. “The Russian offensive beyond the Vistula developed with unprecedented force and speed,” wrote the German General Mellenthin, “it is impossible to describe everything that happened between the Vistula and the Oder in the first months of 1945. Europe has not known anything like this since the fall of the Roman Empire.”

On the fifth day of the offensive, the Red Army captured Warsaw, and in just 23 days of this operation, carried out in difficult winter conditions, the army of G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev advanced 500 km, occupied Krakow, and surrounded a large German group in Poznan. By the end of January - beginning of February, Soviet troops reached the Oder and captured a number of bridgeheads on its left bank, finding themselves 60-70 km from Berlin. Here the Red Army's offensive ended.

Shefov N. Battles of Russia. M., 2002

GATE FOR TANK ARMIES

By that time, the Sandomierz bridgehead was the most powerful of all our bridgeheads on the Vistula; it had a front of about seventy-five kilometers and up to sixty kilometers in depth... Since the main blow was delivered from the Sandomierz bridgehead, the main preparatory measures taken by us were primarily associated with it. The bridgehead was filled in advance, one might say, packed with troops.

This, of course, was not and could not be a secret to the enemy. It is not clear to anyone that if one side has captured such a large bridgehead, and even on such a large river as the Vistula, then a new powerful blow should be expected from here. If a bridgehead is captured, then it is captured so that further offensive actions can be taken from it. So the location of our future breakthrough was no secret to the enemy. And this should have been taken into account.

We foresaw the fiercest resistance of the enemy and, in order to immediately avoid the possibility of bilateral flanking fire by both our strike force and those formations that would later be introduced to develop success, we decided to break through the enemy’s defenses on a wide front.

Further, we envisaged the formation of the strike group in such a way that the strength of our initial strike would be maximum and ensure a rapid breakthrough of the defense on the first day. In other words, we wanted to open the gates through which tank armies could immediately be brought in.

With their help, tactical success will develop into operational success, which we will develop more and more, bringing tank armies into the operational space and developing a breakthrough both in depth and towards the flanks.

PACE

Having begun a breakthrough in several areas significantly distant from each other, amounting to a total of 73 km, the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts on the 3rd-4th day of the operation expanded the offensive front to 500 km, and by the end of the operation to 1000 km. The depth of the operation reached 500 km. The average daily rate of advance was 25 km; on some days the pace reached 45 km for rifle formations, and 70 km for tank and mechanized formations. Such a pace of attack was achieved for the first time in the Great Patriotic War.

Soviet military encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 2.

ZHUKOV: ATTACKING BERLIN WOULD BE AN ADVENTURE

IN AND. Chuikov, without analyzing the complexity of the rear situation in those conditions, writes:

“...if the Headquarters and the front headquarters had properly organized supplies and managed to deliver the required amount of ammunition, fuel and food to the Oder in time, if the aviation had time to relocate to the Oder airfields, and the pontoon-bridge-building units ensured the crossing of troops across the Oder, then our four armies—the 5th Shock, the 8th Guards, the 1st and 2nd Tank—could have developed a further attack on Berlin in early February, advanced another eighty to one hundred kilometers and completed this gigantic operation by capturing the German capital on the move.” .

Discussions on such an important subject with so many references to “if” cannot be considered serious even for a memoirist. But the very admission by V.I. Chuikov that supplies had gone wrong, aviation and pontoon-bridge-building units lagged behind, suggests that in such conditions, undertaking a decisive attack on Berlin would be a pure gamble.

Thus, in February 1945, neither the 1st Ukrainian nor the 1st Belorussian Fronts could carry out the Berlin operation.

IN AND. Chuikov writes:

“On February 4, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front gathered for a meeting at the headquarters of the 69th Army, where he himself arrived, army commanders Berzarin, Kolpakchi, Katukov, Bogdanov and me. We were already sitting at the tables, discussing the plan for the attack on Berlin, when the phone rang on the HF device. I was sitting almost next to him and could clearly hear the conversation on the phone. Called. He asked Zhukov where he was and what he was doing. The marshal replied that he had gathered army commanders at the headquarters of the Kolpakchi army and was planning an attack on Berlin with them.

After listening to the report, Stalin suddenly, completely unexpectedly, as I understand it, demanded for the front commander to stop this planning and begin developing an operation to defeat the Nazi troops of the Vistula Army Group located in Pomerania.”

But there was no such meeting on February 4 at the headquarters of the 69th Army. Therefore, there was also no conversation via HF with I.V. Stalin, about which V.I. Chuikov writes.

IRREVOCABLE LOSSES - 2%

Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation January 12 - February 3, 1945 Number of Soviet troops and casualties

1st Belorussian Front: the number of troops at the beginning of the operation was 1,028,900, irretrievable losses were 17,032, sanitary losses were 60,310.

1st Ukrainian Front: the number of troops at the beginning of the operation was 1,083,800, irretrievable losses were 26,219, sanitary losses were 89,564.

The total number of Soviet troops at the beginning of the operation was 2,112,700, the total irretrievable losses were 43,251 (2.0%), the total sanitary losses were 149,874.

1st Army of the Polish Army: the number of troops at the beginning of the operation was 90,900, irretrievable losses were 225, sanitary losses were 841.

WE ENTER GERMANY AS LIBERATORS

Long before entering the territory of Nazi Germany, at the Military Council we discussed the issue of the behavior of our people on German soil. The Nazi occupiers brought so much grief to the Soviet people, they committed so many terrible crimes that the hearts of our soldiers legitimately burned with fierce hatred for these monsters. But it was impossible to allow sacred hatred of the enemy to result in blind revenge against the entire German people. We fought against Hitler's army, but not against the civilian population of Germany. And when our troops crossed the border of Germany, the Military Council of the front issued an order in which it congratulated the soldiers and officers on the significant event and reminded that we were entering Germany as liberating soldiers. The Red Army came here to help the German people get rid of the fascist clique and the dope with which it poisoned people.

The Military Council called on the soldiers and commanders to maintain exemplary order and hold high the honor of the Soviet soldier.

Commanders and political workers, all party and Komsomol activists tirelessly explained to the soldiers the essence of the liberation mission of the army of the Soviet state, its responsibility for the fate of Germany, as well as for the fate of all other countries that we will save from the yoke of fascism.

It must be said that our people on German soil showed true humanity and nobility.

The offensive of the Soviet troops, which began in January 1945, developed successfully and rapidly. Temporarily fading in one area, it flared up in another. The entire huge front came into motion - from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians.

The Red Army unleashed a blow of enormous force on the enemy, breaking through 1,200 kilometers of powerful lines that he had been creating for several years.

Only a blind man could not see that the war was lost by Nazi Germany.

Orthodox calendar

Sermon

In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit!

Dear brothers and sisters, as we experience the events of this week, you and I can immerse ourselves in that state of soul that presupposes the need for a Christian to become involved, at least to a small degree, in an event related to the deed of God for the sake of people.

The Path of Love presupposes a person’s readiness to learn the most complex art, the mastery of which was demonstrated by the Lord Himself, coming to earth, diminishing Himself to a human body, putting on flesh and then giving it to be crucified for human sins, showing an example of great humility. In this self-abasement of the Lord, the amazing depth of His mercy and willingness to show how many paths to the Heavenly Kingdom there are are revealed to us.

With His most pure hands He washes the feet of His disciples, people of low professions, His followers called to apostolic service. Calling them with Him to a special feast, to the meal where the first Eucharist is celebrated, He, lamenting, but loving the disciple who betrays Him, wants to save him until the last moment, but the soul, which has departed from God, finds it difficult to return to its Savior. Here is the tragedy of a student who quickly demonstrates an example of despair leading to suicide. Next we see the example of the Apostle Peter, who claims that he will not deny, but then does exactly that. And each of us in our lives, unfortunately, repeats his path, saying one thing with our lips, and showing another in our deeds. Then a prayer sounds in the Garden of Gethsemane. The Lord calls the disciples three times to joint prayer, but the apostles are sleeping... And the Savior asks the Father to grant Him the mercy that He must bear.

We need to understand that only part of what we can contain is revealed to us, only part of that pain and suffering. We are talking about the dialogue of the Lord within Himself. After all, the Savior turns to God the Father, Who is in Him. This is one of the deepest mysteries of theology when it comes to the Holy Trinity. But at the same time, these words show us an example of what we must do in situations of special tension and testing: we must call on God for help, adding at the same time: “Thy will be done!”

Then we hear about the betrayal that the disciple commits by kissing Christ in the Garden of Gethsemane. What was this for? It was a sign. The fact is that after Communion the apostles were transformed and became so similar to the Savior that it was difficult to determine who their Teacher was among these people. Apostle Judas points at Jesus and He is arrested. And here mercy is shown when the Lord asks to remove the knife, saying that the one who came with a knife or sword will perish. Here both the external and internal components of a Christian’s life are indicated, which presupposes prayer, humility and a willingness to sacrifice oneself as weapons. An amazing door opens before us, difficult to pass through, but the only one possible for the salvation of our soul.

Let us try, dear brothers and sisters, to be as attentive to words as possible in our lives. Let us learn the art of following Christ in the willingness to start small, in the determination to show our efforts in bearing our cross. Amen!

Archpriest Andrey Alekseev

January 12, 1945 - the Vistula-Oder operation began during the Great Patriotic War

The Vistula-Oder operation of 1945 was a strategic offensive operation of Soviet troops during World War II, on the right flank of the Soviet-German front, in the area between the Vistula and Oder. It was carried out by the forces of the 1st Belorussian (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov) and 1st Ukrainian (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev) fronts in the period from January 12 to February 3, 1945 and became an integral part of the overall strategic offensive Soviet troops from the Baltic to the Danube. The purpose of this operation was to defeat the Nazi Army Group A (from January 26 - “Center”), complete the liberation of Poland from Nazi occupation and create favorable conditions for delivering a decisive blow to Berlin.

By the beginning of 1945, the military-political situation on the Soviet-German front, through the efforts of the Red Army, was changed in favor of the USSR. In addition, the army was replenished with new military equipment, and the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition in 1944 opened a second front in Western Europe and approached the borders of the Reich. At the same time, the German army was in a critical situation - weapons production fell sharply due to factories destroyed in Europe, manpower reserves were exhausted and the Air Force was practically destroyed.

The Soviet command planned to launch an offensive in this direction on January 20, 1945. However, in connection with the major failure of the Anglo-American troops in the Ardennes in early January, British Prime Minister W. Churchill turned to I. Stalin with a request to launch an offensive in order to divert the Nazi forces from the West. And, although preparations for the offensive were not yet completed, the Soviet High Command postponed the start of the operation.

By this time, the balance of forces was as follows: in front of two Soviet fronts there were 3 German armies (28 divisions and 2 brigades) - this is approximately 400 thousand people and several thousand pieces of equipment. In addition to continuous defense lines with a total depth of up to 600 km, the Germans created several fortified areas. In the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, there were 16 combined arms, 4 tank and 2 air armies - in total, about 2 million people and more than 45 thousand pieces of equipment. This was the largest strategic grouping of Soviet troops during all the years of the war. Thus, the superiority of the Soviet troops was overwhelming in manpower and means, which allowed them, after careful preparation, to deliver a very powerful blow.

On January 12, 1945, the famous Vistula-Oder operation began. Early in the morning, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive, delivering the main blow from the Sandomierz bridgehead, and two days later, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front struck from the Magnuszewski and Pulawy bridgeheads. Moreover, the offensive of the Red Army was preceded by a powerful artillery barrage, which caused great damage to the German defensive reserves.

This operation went down in military history as the most rapid offensive: having begun on the territory of Poland, it quickly moved to the territory of Germany - for 20 days, Soviet troops advanced at a distance of 20 to 30 km per day, and with tank armies in certain periods - even up to 70 km per day. Moreover, the offensive did not stop either day or night. This pace was due to a powerful initial strike, great penetrating power and high mobility of Soviet troops, wide maneuver and close interaction of troops. During this time, they overcame seven enemy fortified lines and two large water obstacles.

On January 17, Warsaw was liberated; by January 18, the main forces of the German armies on this front were defeated, the enemy’s defenses were broken through five hundred kilometers of the front to a depth of 100-150 km. And on January 19, the advanced units of the 1st Ukrainian Front, pursuing the enemy, entered German territory, and the troops of the left wing of the front liberated Krakow and many other populated areas. And although the German command began hastily transferring troops here from other sectors of the front and from the reserve, it was unable to restore the broken front.

The Vistula-Oder operation in scope and results achieved became one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War. In just 23 days, the army of G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev not only moved forward and liberated almost all of Poland and a significant part of Czechoslovakia from the German invaders, but also surrounded a large German group in Poznan, reached the Oder and ended up 60-70 km from Berlin. Here the offensive of the Soviet troops ended and preparations for the Berlin operation began.

As a result of the Vistula-Oder operation, 35 German divisions were completely defeated, another 25 lost from 50 to 70% of their personnel, and more than 150 thousand people were captured, as well as several thousand weapons. The losses of Soviet troops amounted, according to various sources, from 160 to 200 thousand people and more than 2 thousand pieces of equipment. For the heroism and courage shown during this operation, many units and formations of both fronts were given honorary names and orders. And in honor of the liberation of the Polish capital from German troops, the medal “For the Liberation of Warsaw” was established.

Series: Soviet holidays. Builder's Day

Builder's Day was first celebrated in the USSR on August 12, 1956. And it was like that. On September 6, 1955, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the establishment of the annual holiday “Builder’s Day” (on the second Sunday of August) was issued. The laconicism of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is proof that Builder's Day did not appear by chance, and that its appearance seemed to go without saying. Here's how the newspapers commented on it:
“A new manifestation of the party and government’s concern for builders is the Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted on August 23, 1955 “On measures for further industrialization, improving the quality and reducing the cost of construction.” This resolution analyzes the state of construction with completeness and clarity and determines further paths for the broad industrialization of the construction business" ("Construction Newspaper", September 7, 1955).

“We builders have a big day! Newspapers and radio spread the message throughout the country that the party and government had adopted a resolution to radically improve the construction industry. At the same time, a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was published on the annual holiday - “Builder's Day”.
A feeling of pride in our country, in our profession and warm gratitude to the party and government for caring about us, builders, filled our hearts...”

Builder's Day was celebrated on August 12. On this day, newspapers wrote: “Builder’s Day, celebrated today for the first time, will henceforth be included in the calendar as a national holiday,” and this was not an exaggeration. Today it’s hard to imagine, but in 1956 the country celebrated the builders’ holiday with considerable enthusiasm, including festivities in cultural and recreation parks. Newspaper reports again allow you to feel the atmosphere of those days:
“Moscow celebrated the holiday of builders with mass celebrations, exhibitions, reports and lectures. The Gorky Central Park of Culture and Leisure was especially crowded. A meeting of builders of the Leninsky district of the capital took place here, who built the architectural ensemble of the Moscow State University building, blocks of residential buildings in the southwest of the capital, and the stadium named after V.I. Lenin, where the flag of the Spartakiad of the Peoples of the USSR is now raised. The builders of the district made a decision - to commission 210 thousand square meters by December 20. m of living space."
“On Sunday, the Chelyabinsk Park of Culture and Recreation was filled with about forty thousand construction workers. A rally took place here..."

"Baku. A solemn meeting of the Baku City Council of Workers' Deputies together with representatives of party, Soviet and public organizations dedicated to Builder's Day was held here. The meeting was attended by the parliamentary delegation of Uruguay visiting here...”

"Tbilisi. On August 11 and 12, folk festivities dedicated to Builder's Day took place in the capital of Georgia. Thousands of workers visited the Permanent Construction Exhibition that opened in the Ordzhonikidze Central Park of Culture and Leisure. It is developed according to a new thematic plan. The main idea of ​​the exhibition is to show elements of precast reinforced concrete, large-block construction and advanced industrial methods of construction and installation work.”

It is curious that many traditions laid down at the dawn of the celebration of Builder’s Day have survived to this day: awards for the holiday, ceremonial meetings with the participation of representatives of government agencies, and simply feasts, which the press of those years does not mention, but which, without a doubt, , took place. It’s just that specialized exhibitions are no longer dedicated to Builder’s Day. And maybe in vain...


Whether he is in a suit, with a new tie,
If he were in the lime, like a snow woman.
Each builder, in a phrase, in a word,
He recognizes the foreman by the interjection!
Here he stands up to his full height,
He makes a toast loudly:
To everyone who levels the wall
Spirit level-trowel,
Who pushes the work
With kind words and swear words,
Who had lunch in the change house,
I ate sausage with radishes,
Who hung with his feet in the sky
On the mounting belt,
To everyone who works in bad weather
With a crowbar, a drill and a saw,
We wish: build happiness!
And don't stand under the arrow!